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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL FRICTIONS, PROPAGATION OF SHOCKS AND
MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY
Cristina Fuentes-Albero
Frank Schorfheide, Professor of Economics
I study the evolution of aggregate volatility in the US during the postwar period by as-
sessing the relative role played by financial shocks, technological progress, and changes
in the financial system. Balance-sheet variables of firms have been characterized by
greater volatility since the early 1970s. This Financial Immoderation has coexisted
with the so-called Great Moderation, which refers to the slowdown in volatility of
real and nominal variables since the mid 1980s. In the second chapter, I study the
moderation in real variables calibrating a real business cycle model with two technol-
ogy shocks. I consider several statistical specifications for technological progress. A
deterministic trend model outperforms in accounting for volatilities, but a stochastic
trend model accounts better for the correlation structure of the data. In the third
chapter, I account for the divergent patterns in volatility analyzing the role played
by financial factors. To do so, I estimate a DSGE model including financial rigidities,
allowing for structural breaks in a subset of parameters. I conclude that the Financial
Immoderation is driven by larger financial shocks and that the estimated reduction in
the size of the financial accelerator in the mid 1980s accounts for 30% of the decline in
the volatilities of investment growth and the nominal interest rate. In the last chap-
ter, I focus on analyzing financial shocks. Using the estimation output, I obtain that
the contribution of financial shocks to the variance of investment is increasing over
time, reducing the relative importance of the investment-specific technology shock.
The estimated reduction in the level of financial rigidities has a significant impact on
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the model implied propagation dynamics. Given that the model implies a negative
response upon impact of consumption in response to a positive business wealth shock,
I empirically characterize the effects of such a financial shock on consumption using
sign restrictions. I conclude that documenting the effects on consumption is not a
trivial matter since the results vary significantly depending on the variables used to
measure business wealth and the cost of external borrowing.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In macroeconomics, economic fluctuations are modeled as shocks to the economy.
Therefore, studying the shocks driving business cycle fluctuations, as well as their
propagation mechanism in the economy, are topics of great interest for researchers.
In fact, business cycle literature has been among the most productive areas of eco-
nomic research over the last decades. The wave of contributions that followed the
seminal work by [47] focused on the role of real shocks as drivers of fluctuations at
business cycle frequencies. [19] conclude that technology shocks account for more
than half of the cyclical variance of output in the postwar period. The empirical suc-
cess of real business cycle (RBC) models has been questioned by [29] among others.
He suggests that the sources of business cycles are non-technology shocks, which is
hard to reconcile with a standard RBC model, but consistent with models featuring
monopolistic competition and sticky prices. Following [29]’s contribution, there was
an expansion of research on the sources of business cycles using a New Keynesian
perspective. Many of these contributions focused on characterizing the propagation
mechanism of monetary policy shocks.
The debate between defenders of technology and non-technology driven business
cycles was heated up by the distinction between neutral and investment-specific tech-
nology shocks proposed by [35]. For example, [36] conclude that investment-specific
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technology shocks account for 30% of output volatility. [26] uses a neoclassical growth
model to identify the short-run effects of neutral and investment-specific technology
shocks. He concludes that the investment-specific technology shock accounts for up
to 67% of the variation in output and 47% of that in hours. Recently, [43] estimate
a New Keynesian model and conclude that the investment-specific technology shock
is the main driver of US business cycle fluctuations in the postwar period. They sug-
gest that such a shock is a proxy for financial shocks or developments in the financial
sector.
Over the last few years, there has been a growing interest in introducing credit
market imperfections in standard macro models to analyze the role played by finan-
cial rigidities in the propagation of economic shocks. [8] and [5] consider frameworks
in which credit market imperfections arise because there is asymmetric information
between borrowers and lenders. This asymmetry translates into external borrowing
being more expensive than internal financing. This wedge is the so called external
finance premium which is the key relationship in the amplification and propagation
mechanism known as the financial accelerator. Once the effects of financial rigidities
on the propagation dynamics of technology and monetary shocks was well docu-
mented, researchers started to consider shocks originated in the financial sector as
potential drivers of the business cycle. For example, [53] construct and study shocks
to the efficiency of the financial sector. They conclude that the median contribution
of these shocks to the variance of investment and output is 45%.
My dissertation focuses on studying the evolution of aggregate volatility in the US
during the postwar period by assessing the relative role played by financial shocks,
technological progress, and changes in the financial system. The US economy over
the last 55 years has been characterized by two empirical regularities. On the one
hand, there has been a slowdown in the magnitude of business cycle fluctuations of
2
real and nominal variables since the mid 1980s. This empirical regularity was pop-
ularized by [57] as the Great Moderation. On the other hand, financial variables
have become more volatile since the early 1970s. I refer to this empirical regularity
as the Financial Immoderation. In the second chapter, I study the moderation in
real variables through the lens of a Neoclassical business cycle model. In the third
chapter, I focus on disentangling the role of financial factors in the divergent patterns
in volatility using a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model. In the last chapter, I analyze the propagation of financial shocks in the theo-
retical economy estimated in chapter 3. Given the lack of guidance on the response
of household consumption to a financial shock affecting firms’ ability to borrow, I
empirically document the effects of a shock to business wealth on consumption using
sign restrictions as proposed by [59].
The second chapter, Technology Shocks, Statistical Models, and the Great Moder-
ation, analyzes the cyclical features implied by a simple RBC model with two tech-
nology shocks a` la [36]. In the spirit of [39], I analyze the performance of the model in
accounting for US business cycle features under trend stationary and difference sta-
tionary technology processes. Calibrating the model to US data, I conclude that the
deterministic trend model outperforms the stochastic trend model in accounting for
business cycle volatilities. The trend stationary model, however, underpredicts the
correlation of consumption and output at all lead and lags, which is at odds with the
data. The difference stationary version of the model overcomes those shortcomings.
Therefore, I can conclude that the difference stationary model is more successful in
matching the correlation structure of the data. The observed reduction in the volatil-
ity of the TFP shock and the price of investment suffices to deliver the magnitude of
the Great Moderation in both models.
The aim of the third chapter, Financial Frictions, the Financial Immoderation,
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and the Great Moderation, is to account for the immoderation of financial cycles and
the moderation of real and nominal cycles analyzing the role played by financial fac-
tors. To do so, I use a DSGE model that includes a financial accelerator mechanism
a` la [5]. Financial rigidities arise form asymmetric information between borrowers
and lenders. Costly state verification implies that external borrowing is more ex-
pensive than internal financing. The difference is the external finance premium. I
enrich the model with financial shocks affecting the two channels of the external fi-
nance premium. The balance sheet channel refers to the negative dependence of the
premium on the amount of collateralized net worth. The asymmetric information
channel establishes that the premium is a positive function of the severity of the
agency problem.
I estimate the model economy using Bayesian techniques on a data set contain-
ing real, nominal, and financial variables. To account for the breaks in the second
moments of the data, I allow for structural breaks in the volatilities of shocks, mon-
etary policy coefficients, and average size of the financial accelerator mechanism. I
conclude that the widening of the financial cycle is driven by larger financial shocks
and that the estimated reduction in the size of the financial accelerator in the mid
1980s accounts for 30% of the decline in the volatilities of investment growth and the
nominal interest rate.
In the last chapter, I assess the relative importance of financial shocks as drivers
of the business cycle in the theoretical economy estimated in chapter 3. I conclude
that financial shocks are not only the drivers of balance sheet variables in the business
sector, but they also become the main sources of variability in investment during the
Great Moderation era, relegating technology shocks to a secondary role. In this chap-
ter, I also document the model implied propagation dynamics of financial shocks and
its evolution over time. I obtain that the estimated reduction in the level of financial
4
rigidity reduces the contemporaneous effects of financial shocks but it enhances their
persistence.
The model implied impulse response functions suggest that consumption and in-
vestment responses to a positive shock affecting business wealth are of opposite signs.
This can be interpreted as being at odds with the common understanding of an
expansionary financial shock. I estimate the effects of shocks to business wealth on
consumption by imposing sign restrictions on the impulse response functions of invest-
ment, business wealth, and the cost of external borrowing. I obtain that expansionary
financial shocks affecting net worth in the business sector have an ambiguous effect
on household consumption.
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Chapter 2
Technology Shocks, Statistical
Models, and The Great
Moderation
2.1 Introduction
Technology driven business cycles have been in the core of the Real Business Cycle
(RBC) literature from its origins. For example, [54] claims that technology shocks
account for more than a half of the US business cycle fluctuations over the postwar
period. In [19], technology shocks account for about 75% of the volatility of output.
Such an empirical success has been questioned by [29] and [30] among others. They
claim that business cycle features are due mainly to non-technology factors. However,
[35] started a new wave of attention on technology-driven business cycles by allowing
for not only a neutral technology shock,I but also an investment-specific one. Recent
contributions to the empirical macro literature, such as [44], show that investment-
specific technology shocks are the main driver of the US business cycle.
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In this paper, I explore the performance of a simple model inspired by [36] un-
der different specifications for the two technology processes. The goal is to determine
which statistical model accounts better for the US business cycle features. In particu-
lar, I consider three different assumptions regarding the stochastic processes governing
technological change. The first statistical model assumes trend stationarity allowing
for any persistence level. In the second statistical model, impose difference station-
arity by assuming that technological progress is described as a random walk with
drift. Finally, I allow for autocorrelated errors in the unit root model. My analysis
is in the spirit of [39]. He explores several specifications for the Solow residual and
concludes that a trend stationary model accounts better for the US business cycle.
[41] revisits [39]’s work by estimating the RBC model using maximum likelihood. He
concludes that an increase in the persistence of technological progress improves the
performance of the model in accounting for the variance of output and consumption.
It deteriorates, however, the success at explaining the volatility of investment and
hours worked. I build upon these two papers by incorporating into the analysis the
investment-specific technology shock. As in [39], I perform a calibration exercise to
assess the ability of the model to describe the US business cycle over the last 50 years.
I conclude, as [39], that trend stationary models account better for the volatility
at business cycle frequencies of real variables. Difference stationary environments,
however, perform better in capturing the correlation structure of the data. I high-
light here that the model implied correlation between consumption and investment
under stationary technological progress is at odds with the data. Such correlation,
however, has a positive sign when technology shocks follow a random walk process.
The statistical model also has a relevant impact on the relative importance of neu-
tral and investment-specific shocks in accounting for the variance of real variables.
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In particular, the relative contribution of the investment-specific shock to the cycli-
cal variability of consumption, investment, capital, and hours worked is significantly
larger under trend stationarity.
The US economy has been characterized by milder fluctuations over the past two
decades. This phenomenon was dated by [45] and [49] and labeled as the Great
Moderation by [57]. Thus, it is challenging to analyze the explanatory power of the
statistical models of interest when the so called Great Moderation is at hand. I want
to determine whether the slowdown in the volatility of the two shocks under analysis
suffices to explain a significant part of the Great Moderation. [4] consider a basic RBC
model a` la [38] with only one technology shock. They conclude that the slowdown in
the volatility of productivity shocks can account for about a 50% decline in business
cycle volatility.
My results suggest that ’good luck’ in the form of smaller innovations to the
technology processes can account for the bulk of the volatility slowdown in my model.
I estimate a reduction in the size of technology shocks of about 45%. All specifications
are able to generate a slowdown in cyclical volatility of significant magnitude. But
the stochastic trend model with autocorrelated errors outperforms the other two
statistical models at accounting for the Great Moderation.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2.2, I set up my baseline model. In
section 2.3, I proceed with my calibration exercises using the three statistical mod-
els under analysis. Section 2.4 presents several counterfactuals in order to analyze
the Great Moderation in the framework defined by my model economy. Section 2.5
concludes.
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2.2 The Model
The model is a simplified version of the one proposed by [36]. In particular, I ab-
stract from different capital goods and variable capital utilization. I do preserve the
existence of both neutral and investment-specific technology shocks.
I consider three statistical versions of the baseline model in order to assess which
one accounts better for the US business cycle features. First, I analyze a determin-
istic trend version of the model where the stochastic processes are trend stationary.
Second, I consider a stochastic trend model where the technology processes follow
a random walk with drift. Finally, I allow for some persistence in the innovation
of the investment-specific technology in a stochastic trend model. Therefore, in the
first case my economy is affected only by temporary shocks. In the second model,
all shocks are permanent. In the last model, I am considering both permanent and
transitory shocks. In particular, any neutral shock will be permanent, while any
investment-specific shock will have both permanent and transitory effects.
Since [51], there has been a large empirical literature about stochastic trends in
macro variables. Unit roots and stationary processes differ in their implications at
infinite time horizons, but for any given finite sample, there is a representative from
either class of models that can account for all the observed features of the data1. In
addition, the lack of power of univariate classical tests for unit roots2 is well known.
Therefore, I choose among the three specifications described above using the following
criterion: the most preferred statistical model will be the one able to account for a
larger proportion of the US business cycle properties.
1For a more detailed discussion on nonstationary time series see [37]
2I have performed ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) tests on all of the variables of interest. I
were not able to reject the null of unit root for all the variables but (log) hours and (log) labor
productivity.
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In this economy, there is a continuum of households that maximize their expected
lifetime utility given by
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Ht)
]
(2.1)
Both [39] and [41] use Hansen-Rogerson preferences3. I divert by using a specification
rather conventional in the empirical macro literature.
U(Ct, Ht) = lnCt −B H
1+1/ν
t
1 + 1/ν
(2.2)
where Ct stands for consumption, Ht for hours worked, ν for the short-run (Frisch)
labor supply elasticity, and B is a preference weight. It is well known that the log
utility in consumption implies a constant long-run labor supply in response to a
permanent change in technology. Hence, I do not have to worry about trending hours
implied by the model even under the difference-stationary specification4.
The representative household supplies labor at the competitive equilibrium wage,
Wt, and rents capital, Kt, to firms at rental rate, Rt. The capital stock depreciates
at rate δ. Therefore the representative household maximizes (2.1) subject to
Ct + P
k
t Xt = WtHt +RtP
k
t Kt (2.3)
(1 + η)Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Xt (2.4)
where P kt is the (relative) price of investment (using the consumption good as a
numeraire) and Xt stands for quality-adjusted investment. Note that while the budget
constraint, equation (2.3), is expressed in consumption units, the capital accumulation
equation, (2.4), is expressed in efficiency units. Population in this economy grows at
3I report in appendix 4.4 the analysis under Hansen-Rogerson preferences.
4See [9] for an interesting treatment of the stationarity of hours issue and [13] for an analysis of
the implications of different labor input measures in a SVAR framework.
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rate (1 + η).
There is also a continuum of firms that rent capital and labor services from house-
holds and produce consumption and investment goods. The representative firm solves
the following problem:
max Πt = Ct + P
k
t Xt −WtHt −RtP kt Kt (2.5)
s.t. Ct +
Xt
Vt
= AtK
α
t H
1−α
t (2.6)
where At is the current level of (neutral) technology and Vt stands for the current level
of the investment-specific technology. Firms produce both consumption and invest-
ment goods only if Vt =
1
Pkt
. A raise in Vt implies a fall in the cost of producing a new
unit of capital in terms of output, which can also be interpreted as an improvement
in the quality of new capital produced with a given amount of resources. Note that
investment in consumption units is defined as It = P
k
t Xt. Therefore, (2.6) is identical
to the familiar resource constraint.
Yt = Ct + It = AtK
α
t H
1−α
t
Let us consider three statistical specifications for the stochastic processes govern-
ing the technology levels in this economy. In the deterministic trend model, technol-
ogy processes are modeled as follows:
At = A0e
γat+εat
Vt = V0e
γvt+εvt
where εat and εat are autoregressive processes. The explicit structure of the errors is
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discussed in section 2.3.
In the stochastic trend version of the model, the processes are given by
At = At−1eγa+εat
Vt = Vt−1eγv+εvt
which implies that the log technologies evolve according to a random walk with drift.
In the baseline stochastic trend model, the errors are assumed to be white noise. In
the stochastic trend model with persistence, the log of investment-specific technology
level is assumed to follow a random walk with drift and moving average component.
Under all the specifications, my model economy exhibits long-run growth. There-
fore, I transform my economy so that I can work with a detrended version of the
original one. In the trend stationary model economy, the following variables are
stationary
Yt
qt
,
Ct
qt
,
It
qt
,
Wt
qt
,
Kt
(qv)t
, Ht, Rt
where q = e
1
1−αγa+
α
1−αγv and v = eγv .
Let us denote a stationary variable Z by Z˜. Therefore, the stationary equilibrium
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conditions for this statistical version of the model are given by:
Y˜t = C˜t + I˜t (2.7)
Y˜t = A0e
εatK˜t
α
H1−αt (2.8)
(1 + η)qvK˜t+1 = (1− δ)K˜t + V0eεvt I˜t (2.9)
1 = βEt
[(
eεvt−εvt+1
qv
)(
C˜t
C˜t+1
)
(1− δ +Rt+1)
]
(2.10)
Ht =
(
1
B
W˜t
C˜t
)ν
(2.11)
Rt = αV0e
εvt
Y˜t
K˜t
(2.12)
W˜t = (1− α) Y˜t
Ht
(2.13)
Given the detrended version of my economy, I can solve for the steady state. Let
us denote the steady state value of a variable Z by Z∗.
Y ∗ = C∗ + I∗ (2.14)
Y ∗ = A0K∗αH∗(1−α) (2.15)
(1 + η)qvK∗ = (1− δ)K∗ + V0I∗ (2.16)
1 = β
(
1
qv
)
(1− δ +R∗) (2.17)
H∗ =
(
1
B
W ∗
C∗
)ν
(2.18)
R∗ = αV0
Y ∗
K∗
(2.19)
W ∗ = (1− α)Y
∗
H∗
(2.20)
Let us consider now the two difference-stationary models. [6] showed in a model
with only one shock that any of the trending variables of these kinds of models can
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be decomposed into a permanent component that is a random walk with drift (a
stochastic trend) and a stationary stochastic process. In my case I have to take into
account that the two stochastic processes have a unit root5. Hence, given such a
statistical model, I have that the following variables are stationary
Ct
Qt
,
It
Qt
,
Yt
Qt
, Ht, Rt,
Kt+1
QtVt
,
Wt
Qt
where Qt = A
1
1−α
t V
α
1−α
t .
The stationary equilibrium conditions are:
Y˜t = C˜t + I˜t (2.21)
Y˜t =
(
1
qtvt
)α
K˜t
α
H1−αt (2.22)
(1 + η)K˜t+1 = (1− δ)
(
1
qtvt
)
K˜t + I˜t (2.23)
1 = βEt
[(
1
qt+1vt+1
)(
C˜t
C˜t+1
)
(1− δ +Rt+1)
]
(2.24)
Ht =
(
1
B
W˜t
C˜t
)ν
(2.25)
Rt = α(qtvt)
Y˜t
K˜t
(2.26)
W˜t = (1− α) Y˜t
Ht
(2.27)
where
qt =
Qt
Qt−1
= e
1
1−α (γa+εat)+
α
1−α (γv+εvt) (2.28)
vt =
Vt
Vt−1
= eγv+εvt (2.29)
5For detrending issues there is no difference between having just a random walk with drift or a
random walk with drift plus a moving average component.
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Given that the stationary version of the difference-stationary model satisfies the
usual assumptions, I can solve for the steady-state of this transformed economy. Then,
Y ∗ = C∗ + I∗ (2.30)
Y ∗ =
(
1
q∗v∗
)
(K∗)α(H∗)1−α (2.31)
(1 + η)K∗ = (1− δ)
(
1
q∗v∗
)
K∗ + I∗ (2.32)
1 = β
(
1
q∗v∗
)
(1− δ +R∗) (2.33)
H∗ =
(
1
B
W ∗
C∗
)ν
(2.34)
R∗ = αq∗v∗
Y ∗
K∗
(2.35)
W ∗ = (1− α)Y
∗
H∗
(2.36)
where q∗ = e
1
1−αγa+
α
1−αγv and v∗ = eγv
2.3 Calibration
2.3.1 Data set
I use the data set constructed by [55]. They use data from NIPA-BEA, FAT-BEA,
BLS, and [20] to construct quarterly series of investment-specific technological change
and neutral technological change. Basically, they construct a series for the relative
price of investment (in terms of the consumption good) that spans from 1948.I to
2006.IV and then proceed with a growth accounting exercise to recover the neutral
technological change series. While the investment-specific process is approximated
by the inverse of the (relative) price of investment, the neutral technology process is
associated with the Solow residual of the economy.
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In the literature, there can be found different ways of computing the quarterly
Solow residual. [19] claim that as the BEA produces only annual estimates for the
capital stock, any quarterly series introduces additional noise in the measure of the
Solow residual. Therefore, they propose a ’conservative’ approach by omitting capital
when computing the neutral technology process. This approach has been widely used
in the literature, for a recent example see [4]. [34] establish that another justification
for omitting capital could be measurement errors. However, mismeasurement affects
the level of the capital stock but not its time series properties. Thus, other approaches
construct quarterly capital series by iterating on the law of motion for capital. Note
that as [35] point out, I have to be careful when constructing my capital stock series
since it must be in efficiency units. In the data base, capital stock series is constructed
recursively using the perpetual inventory method
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Xt
where Xt is the total nominal investment deflated by the quality-adjusted price of
investment. Therefore, Xt stands for investment in efficiency units. δ is the average
depreciation rate of the time-varying physical depreciation rates for total capital
available from [20]. The initial capital stock in efficiency units is calibrated using
the steady-state investment equation.
I first perform my calibration exercise matching moments of the whole sample,
ranging from 1948 to 2006. But, as I state in the introduction to this paper, the US
economy has been characterized by milder business cycle fluctuations since the mid
1980s. There is a consensus in the empirical macro literature on dating the Great
Moderation as a regularity starting in 1984. Therefore, I also conduct my analysis by
dividing the sample in 1984. In this way, I can test whether the empirical success of
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my model in delivering the business cycle features characterizing the US economy is
homogenous across subsamples. In addition, I can study the ability of the model in
delivering the observed slowdown in aggregate volatility.
2.3.2 Deterministic trend model
I consider the following statistical specification:
lnAt = lnA0 + γat+ εat
lnVt = lnV0 + γvt+ εvt
which has been estimated using the following econometric strategy:
1. Regress each technological change series on a constant and a linear time trend
lnAt = ϕa + γat+ εat (2.37)
lnVt = ϕv + γvt+ εvt (2.38)
2. Generate the corresponding residual series {εˆat} and {εˆvt}.
3. Estimate univariate autoregressive processes for those shocks
εat = ρaεat−1 + ξat (2.39)
εvt = ρv1εvt−1 + ρv2εvt−2 + ξvt (2.40)
where ξa ∼ N (0, σ2ξa) and ξv ∼ N (0, σ2ξv). The lag structure for the errors has
been chosen following the Akaike Information and the Bayesian Information
Criteria.
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The estimated parameters are reported in table 2. I observe that in the post-1984
period there has been a 48% reduction in the volatility of the innovation to the
neutral technology and a 40% reduction in the volatility of the innovation to the
investment-specific technology. I analyze in section 2.4 if such a reduction in innova-
tions’ volatilities suffices to explain the slowdown in the volatility of the real variables
of interest.
In my model the vector of parameters is given by
(α, γa, γv, β, δ, B, ν, η, µ, ϕa, ϕv, ρa, ρv1, ρv2, σξa , σξv)
where µ is a scaling parameter chosen so that steady state output is equal to 1. I can
estimate (α, γa, γv, η, ϕa, ϕv, ρa, ρv1, ρv2, σξa , σξv) from the data. In order to calibrate
the remaining parameters I consider the targets specified in table 1.
Given my specification, I cannot calibrate both ν and B. In fact, my calibrated B
will be conditional on the choice for the Frisch elasticity parameter. In the literature I
find values for such a parameter in a wide range encompassing values between 0.2 and
∞. To keep the analysis simple, I simulate my model considering a small grid for the
labor supply elasticity. In particular, ν = {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}. The calibrated parameters
are reported in table 2.
Table 6 in appendix A.1 reports my results for the grid over the short-run elastic-
ity of labor supply, ν. The ability of my model to account for the US business cycle
features is sensitive to the value of the parameter governing the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply. Cyclical volatility of all variables but consumption and labor produc-
tivity are a positive function of the short-run elasticity of labor. In particular, the
volatility of investment in efficiency units, output, and hours worked are significantly
closer to the observed variability under ν = 2 than with ν = 0.5.
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The deterministic trend model is able to account for some relevant features of US
business cycles irrespective of my choice for ν. In particular, the model accounts for
the large fluctuations of investment compared to output and for the small fluctuations
of capital and consumption compared to output.
The standard deviation of hours implied by the model is smaller than the standard
deviation of labor productivity which is at odds with the data. This is, however, a
typical feature of RBC models with utility non-linear in hours. [39]’s deterministic
trend model was able to account for the pattern in the data by assuming that labor
is indivisible and that agents trade employment lotteries6.
The trend stationary model generates too much volatility in consumption in the
first subsample for any value of the Frisch elasticity. For ν = {1, 1.5, 2}, the model
overestimates capital volatility for the pre-1984 sample.
Finally, this statistical version of my baseline RBC model cannot generate enough
correlation between output and consumption. It generates, however, a large correla-
tion between labor productivity and output that is at odds with the data. Moreover,
the model cannot account for the change in sign in such a correlation in the second
sub-sample.
6The results under those assumptions for my model are reported in appendix A.6.1. I conclude
that if the stochastic processes are trend stationary, a model a` la Hansen overstates the volatilities of
investment, output, capital, and hours. In such a setting, a model economy with only an investment-
specific technology shock is able to replicate the volatility of hours. I also conclude that under a
difference stationary framework my model economy is still not able to generate enough volatility for
all the variables at hand.
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2.3.3 Stochastic trend model
Random walk with drift
Following [46] when addressing the difference stationary specification, I restrict my
attention to the following class of parametric forms
Φ(L)(1− L)log(Xt) = γx + Θ(L)εxt
where Φ(L) and Θ(L) are lag polynomials whose roots are outside the unit circle.
The statistical model to be considered in this section is as follows
lnAt = lnAt−1 + γa + εat
lnVt = lnVt−1 + γv + εvt
which can be rewritten as
lnAt = lnA0 + γat+
t∑
i=0
εat−i
lnVt = lnV0 + γvt+
t∑
i=0
εvt−i
Note that any shock to the stochastic trend at time t has a permanent effect in the
log-level of the technology processes. Therefore, I am abstracting from transitory
shocks in this specification which implies that I am just analyzing a lower bound of
the effects of technology shocks.
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Following [26] and [25], I assume
 εat
εvt
 ∼ N

 0
0
 ,D
 (2.41)
where D is a diagonal matrix i.e.
D =
 σ2a 0
0 σ2v

My estimates are reported in table 3. Under this specification, I estimate a reduction
in the volatility of the innovations to the technology shocks of about 48%. In this
version of the baseline RBC model, my calibration targets are identical to the ones
in the previous subsection. The calibrated parameters are given in table 3.
In table 7 of appendix A.1, I report the results for the different values of the Frisch
elasticity. The results for the volatility of output, investment, capital, and hours are
also sensitive to the value of such a parameter. This statistical specification accounts
for the same qualitative features of the US business cycle as the deterministic trend
version.
The difference-stationary model does not overpredict the volatilities of consump-
tion and capital. In fact, this statistical version of the model generates lower volatil-
ities for all the variables than the trend stationary one. In addition, the stochastic
trend model is successful in accounting for the correlation of consumption and output.
But it shares with the deterministic trend model the remaining unmatched features.
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Random walk with drift and moving average component
Following [11], I allow for a moving average component in the unit root specification
for the investment-specific technology process. Thus, (2.41) can be substituted by
lnVt = lnVt−1 + γv + ρεvt−1 + ξt (2.42)
I do not modify my statistical specification for the neutral technology process
since there is no empirical evidence for the inclusion of a moving average component
in such a representation.
Note that (2.42) allows for both temporary and permanent shocks. In particular,
a fraction 1/(1− ρ) of any innovation to the investment-specific shock is permanent.
The remainder has a temporary effect.
My estimation results are reported in table 4. I also observe here a reduction
in the volatility of the innovations to the technology shocks of about 56% for the
investment-specific technology and 48% for the neutral one.
The results over the grid for the elasticity of labor supply with respect to real
wage are reported in table 8 in appendix A.1. This version of the stochastic trend
model shares all the ’virtues’ of the baseline stochastic trend model and improves
upon some of its shortcomings. For example, the volatility of hours is larger than in
the baseline difference-stationary model.
2.3.4 Comparing statistical models
From my previous analysis, I can conclude that irrespective of the value for ν, all the
statistical models are able to qualitatively reproduce the slowdown in volatility. While
the baseline difference-stationary model implies a reduction in the volatility of the
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variables at hand of about 52%, the trend-stationary model overpredicts the slowdown
for all the variables but output. Even though the baseline stochastic trend model
outperforms the other two statistical specifications, it over predicts the slowdown in
capital, hours, and labor productivity. The model implies a 48% reduction while in
the data I observe about a 35% slowdown.
To continue my analysis let us set the Frisch elasticity parameter equal to 1. I
have chosen only one value in the grid for expositional purposes. Table 9 reports how
much volatility each model is able to account for. I observe that the trend-stationary
model outperforms the difference-stationary models for the volatility of all variables
but labor productivity. Notice that the stochastic trend model with a moving average
component performs relatively better than the baseline stochastic trend model in the
first sub-sample under analysis.
In table 10, I report the variance decomposition for the different specifications
under analysis. It is remarkable that for the deterministic trend model the investment-
specific shock is the main contributor to the variance of consumption, capital, and
hours. Therefore, I conclude that if I were interested in matching volatility levels using
a simple level stationary RBC model, I should include not only the usual neutral
productivity shock but also an investment specific disturbance. Note that for the
stochastic trend versions of my model, the neutral shock accounts for the bulk of the
variance for all variables. Therefore, failing to include an investment shock will not
worsen the results as much as it would under a deterministic trend environment.
Figures A-1 and A-2 are the impulse response functions for the deterministic trend
version and the baseline stochastic trend one. The responses to a neutral innovation
only differ in the steady state to which each economy converges. Short run dynamics
of consumption, hours, and labor productivity in response to an investment-specific
shock are richer in a level stationary environment than in a difference stationary one.
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That would help to explain that the deterministic trend model accounts better for
macro volatilities.
Let us now analyze the performance of the statistical specifications of my RBC
model in terms of accounting for the correlation structure of the data. From table 11,
I can conclude that all versions do a similar job replicating the correlation between
all the variables of interest and output but consumption. While the stochastic trend
versions of the baseline model are able to account fairly well for the correlation be-
tween consumption and output, the deterministic trend version falls too short. All
the different specifications of the RBC model under analysis perform very poorly in
matching the low correlation between output and labor productivity. Moreover, none
of them is able to reproduce the change in sign I observe in the post-1984 period.
[39] concluded that the deterministic trend model is the best one accounting for
correlations of all the variables with output. Conversely, from my results I conclude
that the stochastic trend model outperforms the deterministic trend one.
Given the counterintuitive result obtained for the correlation between consump-
tion and output for the deterministic trend model, I have explored the cross-correlations
with output for five lags and leads, and the correlations of other pairs of variables.
Table 15 reports the cross-correlations with output for lags and leads. I conclude
that the results for all versions of the model are similar for all variables but con-
sumption. Not only the deterministic trend under predicts the correlation between
consumption and output for the current period, but also under predicts for all lags
and leads. The stochastic versions of the model, however, account for the relative
magnitude and signs at all lags and leads.
Table 12 reports the correlations for different pairs of variables. As expected,
none of the versions of the model can capture any of the correlations with labor
productivity. For all the other moments not involving consumption, the performance
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of all the statistical specifications is fairly uniform. Let us give a closer look to the
correlations with consumption. First of all, the deterministic trend model predicts
negative correlations between consumption and investment in efficiency units and
hours which are at odds with the data. The stochastic specifications account correctly
for the sign of the moments of interest. Secondly, I should stress out here that
while the stochastic trend model with a moving average component can account for
the relative magnitude of the increase in the correlation between consumption and
investment, capital, and hours across subsamples, the baseline stochastic trend model
fails to do so except for capital.
Given the above, I can conclude that choosing one specification over the others
depends upon what I am attempting to explain. If I were interested in matching
volatilities I would choose, as [39], the deterministic trend model. However, I would
need to include in my RBC model not only a neutral productivity shock, but also
an investment-specific one. If I wanted to match correlations7, I would choose a
stochastic trend model. Finally, if I wanted to match the magnitude of the volatility
slowdown in the 1980s, I would also choose a stochastic trend model since the model
implied slowdown is the closest to the observed one.
2.4 The Great Moderation
So far, I have performed my analysis allowing for changes in all the structural pa-
rameters over the two subsamples of interest. In such a way I have shown that any
of the statistical versions of my RBC model is able to account for a slowdown in
macro volatilities. However, I am more interested in analyzing which percentage of
7Let us use the term correlation in a broad sense ie it refers not only to the correlation with
output, but also to the cross-correlations considering lags and leads, and the correlation for any
other pair of variables
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the performance of my model due only to ’good luck’.
Thus, to better assess the relative importance of each technology shock in explain-
ing the Great Moderation, I perform some counterfactuals in the spirit of the ones
performed by [4]. In particular, I proceed with three experiments in two scenarios.
In the first scenario, I calibrate the parameters of the model to match the targets for
the whole sample (i.e., I fix them equal to the first column of tables 2, 3, and 4). In
the second scenario, I allow for time variation in the coefficients of the laws of motion
for the technology processes.
In the first counterfactual I analyze the explicative power of the neutral tech-
nology shock. To do so, I set the volatility of the innovation to the investment-specific
technology to match its volatility for the entire sample. The standard deviation of
the neutral innovation, however, changes across subsamples. The second counter-
factual is analogous to the first one but I focus on the investment-specific technology
shock. Finally, in the third counterfactual I explore the explicative power of both
shocks jointly by letting their standard deviations vary across subsamples.
The results under time invariant coefficients are reported in table 16. For the
first experiment, I observe that while the stochastic trend models can reproduce
a large fraction of the slowdown observed in the data, the trend-stationary model
does only an acceptable job of accounting for the slowdown in output and labor
productivity volatilities. My main conclusion from this experiment is that smaller
neutral technology innovations suffice to explain a large proportion of the aggregate
stability observed in the mid 1980s if the model economy is difference stationary.
From the second counterfactual, I conclude that the role of the investment-specific
shock as a single actor is greatly reduced. For example, for the deterministic trend
case I have that although the investment-specific shock is 62% as volatile in the post-
1984 as in the pre-1984 period, this has a very small effect on the volatility of output,
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investment, and labor productivity. However, I observe a reduction of about 22% in
the volatility of consumption, capital, and hours. The relevance of the investment
shock to explain the slowdown in real variables in my difference stationary economy
is almost negligible.
Using the third experiment, I can quantify the relative importance of the inter-
action between the two shocks active in my model economy. Here all the models are
able to imply volatility slowdowns relatively similar to the ones in the data which
implies that the interaction between the two technology shocks is significant.
Let us now perform the same counterfactuals but allowing for time variation not
only in the volatilities of the innovation processes, but also in the laws of motion of the
technology processes. Results are reported in table 17. The results are qualitatively
similar to the ones explained previously. On the one hand, the investment shock
in a difference stationary economy is not sufficient to induce a slowdown in macro
volatilities of a similar magnitude to the ones observed in the data. The role of
such a shock is larger for a level stationary economy. It is remarkable that the role
of the investment shock is larger when the law of motion of the technology level is
time-varying than when it is assumed to be fixed across subsamples. From the last
experiment, I can conclude again that the stochastic trend model accounts better for
the magnitude of the slowdown than the deterministic trend one. In this environment,
the slowdown implied by the level stationary model is not only larger than the one
observed in the data, but also larger than the one implied by the model under time-
invariant laws of motion.
I conclude that while the neutral shock is the main driving force in the slowdown
in volatilities generated by my difference-stationary model, allowing for a larger finan-
cial flexibility in the form of milder investment-specific shocks substantially improves
its ability to reproduce the magnitude of the observed slowdown. Such a financial
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flexibility plays an even larger role in a level stationary economy since not only en-
hances the slowdown due to the neutral shock, but also it is the main driving force
in the slowdown of consumption, capital, and hours volatility. Therefore, the Great
Moderation in my setting is not due only to ’good luck’ but also to the interaction
between the two technology shocks.
2.5 Conclusion
I find that the choice of the statistical model for the stochastic processes in an RBC
model with two technology shocks is not a trivial one. In fact, one model would be
preferred to the others depending on the features of the business cycle the researcher
wants to match.
I conclude that even though the neutral technology shock is the main driving
force in replicating the Great Moderation, having both technology shocks translate
into a better accounting for such a macroeconomic phenomenon. Therefore, the cross
effects seem to be relevant. However, a bivariate specification of the innovations to
the technology processes does not translate into a significative improvement of the
performance of the model under analysis(see appendix A.6.2).
I have shown that in a simple RBC model the two technology shocks can explain
approximately 70% of the observed slowdown in volatilities of US macro variables in
mid 1980s. The remaining 30% could be explained as suggested in the literature by
a reduction in the standard deviation of other shocks such as preference shocks, by
an improved financial environment, or by good policy. Discriminating among those
alternatives requires a richer model which is beyond the scope of my analysis.
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Chapter 3
Financial Frictions, the Financial
Immoderation, and the Great
Moderation
3.1 Introduction
The U.S. economy over the 1954-2006 period has been characterized by two empirical
regularities. On the one hand, since the mid 1980s, fluctuations at business cycle
frequencies for real and nominal variables are milder. This decline in macroeconomic
volatility defines the so-called Great Moderation. On the other hand, financial vari-
ables have become more volatile over time. [42] document an increase in the volatility
of debt and equity financing in the nonfarm business sector contemporaneous with
the slowdown in the amplitude of the real cycle. In this paper, I reconsider the study
of the balance-sheet data for the nonfarm business sector along with other financial
variables, such as balance-sheet data for households, net private savings, and demand
deposits at commercial banks. I document that the widening of the financial cycle
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starts in 1970. I label this second empirical regularity the Financial Immoderation.
I account for those divergent patterns in volatility by means of a structural model.
I consider a model featuring a standard set of real and nominal frictions as in [56]
extended to accommodate financial rigidities as in [5]. I enrich the theoretical en-
vironment by including financial shocks affecting the spillovers of credit market im-
perfections on the economy. This theoretical framework allows us to quantify the
relative role played by financial factors, monetary policy, and economic shocks in
shaping the evolution of aggregate volatility. To do so, I estimate my model using a
data set containing real, nominal, and financial variables. To account for the breaks
in the second moments of the data, I allow for structural breaks in the average level of
financial rigidity, coefficients in the monetary policy rule, and the size of shocks. As
a byproduct of my analysis, I can not only characterize the propagation mechanism
of financial shocks in the US economy, but also study its evolution over the last 50
years.
One of the main objectives of this paper is to quantify the relative role played by
financial factors in shaping macroeconomic and financial volatilities. However, the
workhorse dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model used in the litera-
ture abstracts from interactions between credit markets and the rest of the economy.
This benchmark macroeconomic model is based on the capital structure irrelevance
theorem by [50]; that is, the composition of agents’ balance sheets has no effect on
their optimal decisions. Nevertheless, episodes such as the Great Depression or the
current financial turmoil stand as compelling evidence of the linkage between the de-
velopments in the financial and real sectors. Along these lines, recent contributions to
the literature have focused on incorporating credit markets in the workhorse DSGE
model. For example, [5] and [40] stress the relevance of the balance sheet’s condition
in determining economic activity. The ability to borrow depends upon borrowers’
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wealth, which ultimately affects the demand for capital and the level of economic
activity they can engage in.
Following [16], I consider a theoretical framework with real and nominal rigidities
as in [56] enriched with frictions in the credit market a` la [5]. In this environment,
asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders arises because the return to
capital depends not only on aggregate but also on idiosyncratic risk. While borrowers
freely observe the realization of their idiosyncratic productivity shock, lenders must
pay monitoring costs to observe the realized return of a borrower. To minimize
monitoring costs, lenders audit borrowers only when they report their inability to pay
the loan back under the terms of the contract. In order to be compensated for the
risk of default, lenders extend loans at a premium over the risk-free interest rate. The
composition of borrowers’ balance sheets determines the external finance premium at
which the loan is settled. The lower an entrepreneur’s net worth (collateral) with
respect to her financing needs, the higher the premium required in equilibrium. The
external finance premium is at the heart of the mechanics operating in the financial
accelerator emphasized by [5]. The financial accelerator hypothesis states that credit
market imperfections amplify and propagate economic shocks. For example, in an
economic downturn, borrowers’ wealth deteriorates because of the decline in asset
prices. Such a reduction in the value of collateral translates into a higher premium
requested by lenders. Relatively more expensive credit reduces the incentives to
engage in investment activities, depressing output production even further. The latter
generates an additional drop in asset prices, which feeds the chain again.
In a model a` la [5], the external finance premium is driven by two channels:
the balance-sheet channel and the information channel. The balance-sheet channel
captures the dependence of external financing opportunities on the composition of
firms’ balance sheets. The information channel implies that the external finance
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premium is a positive function of the severity of the agency problem. I enrich the
DSGE model by introducing financial shocks affecting those two channels. Exogenous
shocks to the balance-sheet channel are introduced in the form of wealth shocks.
Shocks to the information channel are modeled as innovations affecting the parameter
governing agency costs. In this paper, I study the relative role played by those two
shocks in shaping the evolution of aggregate volatility. I also analyze the propagation
mechanism of the two financial shocks in the US economy.
I estimate the model economy using Bayesian techniques on a standard data set
of real and nominal variables extended to include a series for firms’ net worth. I need
to take a stand on defining the empirical equivalent to such a model variable. I focus
on the data provided by the Flow of Funds Accounts to define net worth as tangible
assets minus credit market liabilities for the nonfarm business sector, measured in real
per capita terms. As I have stated above, I perform the estimation exercise using the
whole data sample, but I allow for structural breaks in the variances of the shocks,
the coefficients in the monetary policy rule, and the average size of the financial
accelerator. Therefore, I consider three explanations for the Financial Immoderation
and the Great Moderation: changes in the size of shocks, changes in the conduct of
monetary policy, and changes in the US financial system.
The main empirical findings of the paper are the following. Financial factors
play a significant role in shaping financial and macroeconomic volatilities. Financial
shocks are the only driver of the variance of financial flows. Therefore, the increase
in fluctuations at business cycle frequencies for balance-sheet variables is driven by
larger financial shocks hitting the US economy.
I also find that while the average level of financial rigidities do not change in
the 1970s, the estimated decrease in the mid 1980s is more than 75%. This decline
accounts for more than 30% of the reduction in the cyclical volatility of investment
32
and the nominal interest rate. The effect on the remaining variables is, however,
negligible.
This paper relates to two strands of the empirical macro literature. The first strand
addresses the study of the Great Moderation, that is, the evolution of volatilities at
business cycle frequencies during the second half of the last century. The second
strand considers the estimation of the financial accelerator model.
Since [45] and [49] dated the start of the Great Moderation, there has been a
growing literature on dissecting the possible sources of such a mildness in real business
cycle fluctuations. Recent contributions have focused on analyzing the link between
financial innovations and aggregate volatility. My paper is along the lines of [42]
and [21], who consider credit market frictions only for firms. In particular, I obtain
an estimated reduction in the average level of financial rigidities during the Great
Moderation similar to the ones provided by those two papers.
The literature on bringing the financial accelerator by [5] to the data through an
estimation exercise is less vast than the literature on the Great Moderation. Most of
the contributions estimate the theoretical environment using only nominal and real
variables and focusing on data from the Volcker-Greenspan era. To the best of my
knowledge, besides the study of the Great Depression by [16], the only reference using
pre-1980s data is the recent work by [33], whose sample spans 1973 to 2008. They do
not address, however, the break in second moments of the data observed in the mid
1980s.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 presents the empirical evidence
that motivates the paper. I describe the model in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 discusses
the choice of parameters allowed to change over time. I describe the estimation
procedure and report the estimation results in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 analyzes the
drivers of the divergent patterns in volatility. Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 Empirical Motivation
This section presents the empirical evidence that motivates the paper. It characterizes
real, nominal, and financial cycles over the period 1954-2006. I do not consider more
recent data for reasons of data accuracy. Revisions of NIPA data within a year of
publication and of Flow of Funds Accounts within two or three years of publication are
often considerable. In addition, at the end of the sample it is difficult to distinguish
trend breaks from cycles.
I set the empirical characterization considering two structural breaks in the data:
1970 and 1984. Let us start by motivating the choice of 1984. Since the contributions
by [45] and [49], there has been a consensus in the empirical macro literature about
the existence of a break in the second moments characterizing real and nominal cycles
around 1984. [57] popularized it as the starting point of the Great Moderation.
The choice of the break in 1970 is based on several observations. First, analyzing
the evolution of the cyclical component of balance-sheet variables such as the debt-
to-net-worth ratio reported in Figure B-1, I conclude that the cycle becomes wider
in the 1970s. Moreover, both inflation and the federal funds rate are more volatile in
the 1970s and early 1980s. The high and volatile inflation over the period has been
the subject of careful study by researchers such as [15], [52], and [18], among others.
Second, the 1970s are convulsive years in US economic history. There were signif-
icant changes not only in the financial system but also in other areas of the economic
system. In the financial arena, the 1970s was the decade of the introduction of ATMs,
phone transfers for savings balances at commercial banks, NOW (negotiable order of
withdraw) accounts, money market certificates with yields tied to US Treasury secu-
rities, IRAs (individual retirement accounts), MMMF (market money mutual funds),
incorporation of the NYSE, a partial lifting of Regulation Q, the Securities Protection
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Act, the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Control Act, the Electronic
Fund Transfers Act, the International Banking Act, the Bankruptcy Reform Act, etc.
At the same time, the US experienced the collapse of the Bretton Woods currency-
exchange mechanism, the appointment of Burns as chairman of the Federal Reserve
System after 19 years of Martin, the end of the Vietnam war, the oil crises, the stagfla-
tion episode, several government bailouts of the automobile and aviation industries,
and the start of the service economy. Therefore, testing for a break at the beginning
of the 1970s seems a natural candidate.
Tables 23 and 24 report Chow tests on the average squared residuals of regressing
an AR(1) with drift for the definition of the variables of interest used in the estimation
exercise and their cyclical component, respectively. I reject the null of parameter
constancy when testing for a break in 1970 for net worth, inflation, and the federal
funds rate for both definitions of the variables. I reject the null for all variables
except labor share using the two definitions at hand when the break is set in 1984.
Finally, I also reject the null for all variables except labor share when considering
the two breaks jointly. In particular, the log-likelihood ratio statistic is larger for this
scenario than when considering single breaks. Therefore, I can conclude that the data
are best represented by a scenario that allows for two breaks in second moments.
I report in Table 25 the ratio of standard deviations of the cyclical component
for a set of real, nominal, and financial variables. Although the focus of my paper
is on financial variables related to the nonfarm business sector, I analyze here a
broader data set, including net worth of households, net private savings, and demand
deposits at commercial banks. Following [42], I report in the first column of Table 25
the ratio of cyclical standard deviations when only a break in 1984 is considered.
All the variables included in my data set deliver the patterns described by [42]; that
is, there is a contemporaneous moderation in the real side of the economy and an
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exacerbation in the volatility of financial variables. The magnitude of the changes
is also along the lines of the results provided by those authors. The novelty of my
analysis is the consideration of two breakpoints. The second and third columns of
Table 25 report the relevant statistics to characterize the three subperiods of interest:
1954-1969, 1970-1983, 1984-2006. Therefore, in the remainder of this section I focus
my discussion on analyzing the information provided by the last two columns of the
table.
Let us start by comparing the standard deviation of the cyclical component in
the 1970-1983 sample period with that of the 1954-1969 era. The volatility of real
variables is, on average, 50% greater in the 1970s and early 1980s than in the pre-
1970 period. Nominal variables are also more volatile in the 1970-1983 sample period,
but the increase in their cyclical volatility is greater than the one observed for real
variables. In particular, the standard deviation of the cyclical component of both
inflation and nominal interest rates more than doubles in the 1970s and early 1980s
with respect to the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, all financial variables are also more
volatile over the second sample period. The more dramatic change is the one ex-
perienced by demand deposits at commercial banks whose variability triples in the
1970-1983 sample period.
In the last column of Table 25, I compare the standard deviations of the cyclical
components for the post-1984 period with that of the 1970-1983 sample period. The
volatility of consumption, investment, and output decreases by about 55%. This
result is what characterizes the Great Moderation per se. The slowdown in the
cyclical variability of hours and labor share is milder. Nominal variables, also in this
case, follow the pattern of change of real variables. Financial variables, however,
are more volatile in the 1984-2006 sample period. The most significant increases in
cyclical variability are the ones for net worth for the nonfarm business sector and net
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private savings. Both of them are 45% more volatile in the Great Moderation era than
in the Great Inflation period (1970-1983). Therefore, I can state that the post-1984
period is characterized by an additional increase in the volatility of financial variables
at business cycle frequencies.
I can summarize the empirical regularities present in the US aggregate data over
the 1954-2006 period as follows. The first subperiod, 1954-1969, is characterized by
relatively stable inflation and interest rates. The 1970-1983 sample period constitutes
the first stage of the Financial Immoderation. In this period, fluctuations at busi-
ness cycle frequencies of real, nominal, and financial variables become wider. The
last subperiod expands from 1984 to the end of the sample. It is characterized by
the coexistence of the second stage of the Financial Immoderation and the Great
Moderation.
3.3 The Model
My theoretical framework features real and nominal rigidities as in [56] and [12].
However, to assess the role played by financial frictions in the evolution of volatilities
in the US economy, I extend the framework including financial rigidities as in [5].
Financial frictions arise because there is asymmetric information between borrowers
and lenders. Following Townsend’s (1979)’s costly state verification framework, I
assume that while borrowers freely observe the realization of their idiosyncratic risk,
lenders must pay monitoring costs to observe an individual borrower’s realized return.
Since [16] integrated the financial accelerator mechanism of [5] in the workhorse
DSGE model, several studies have focused on assessing the empirical relevance of the
financial accelerator by comparing the model fit with that of the workhorse DSGE
model or on studying the propagation of real and nominal shocks. In this paper, I
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focus the analysis on two issues: the role of financial shocks and the model’s poten-
tial to account for breaks in the second moments of the data. I incorporate in the
theoretical framework a shock to firms’ wealth and a shock to agency costs. While
the former has been previously studied, the inclusion of the latter is a major novelty
of this paper.
My model economy is populated by households, financial intermediaries, entrepre-
neurs, capital producers, intermediate good firms, retailers, and government. En-
trepreneurs are the only agents able to transform physical capital into capital services
to be used in production. They purchase capital from capital producers and rent it to
intermediate goods firms. Capital acquisition can be finance using internal financing
and external borrowing. Financial intermediaries capture funds from households in
the form of deposits and lend them to entrepreneurs. Intermediate goods firms carry
out production by combining capital and labor services. Retailers generate the final
good of this economy by combining intermediate goods. The government conducts
both fiscal and monetary policy. In order to have non-neutrality of monetary policy, I
need to include a nominal rigidity in a monopolistically competitive sector. Assuming
entrepreneurs have market power would make it more difficult to solve for the debt
contract. Hence, I introduce sticky prices in the intermediate good sector instead.
3.3.1 Households
I assume there is a continuum of infinitely lived households whose length is unity.
They work, consume, invest savings in a financial intermediary in the form of de-
posits that pay a risk-free rate of return, purchase nominal government bonds, re-
ceive dividends from their ownership of firms, pay lump-sum taxes, and obtain (give)
wealth transfers from (to) entrepreneurs.The representative household chooses a plan
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for {Ct, Dt+1, Ht, NBt+1} to maximize her expected discounted lifetime utility
Et
∞∑
j=0
βjbt+j
[
ln(Ct+j − hCt+j−1)− θt+j
H
1+1/ν
t+j
1 + 1/ν
]
(3.1)
subject to
Ct +Dt+1 +
NBt+1
Pt
≤ Wt
Pt
Ht +Rt−1Dt +Rnt−1
NBt
Pt
+ divt − Tt − Transt(3.2)
where Ct stands for consumption, h for the degree of habit formation, Dt+1 for today’s
real deposits in the financial intermediary, Ht for hours worked, ν for the Frisch
elasticity of labor, bt for a shock to the stochastic discount factor, θt for a labor supply
shifter, Pt for the price level of the final good,
Wt
Pt
for real wage, Rt for the risk-free
real interest rate paid on deposits, Rnt for the risk-free nominal interest rate paid on
government bonds, NBt for nominal government bonds, Tt for real taxes (subsidies)
paid to (received from) the government, divt for dividends obtained from ownership
of firms, and Transt for wealth transfers from/to the entrepreneurial sector. The
nature of these transfers is described in section 3.3.5.
The shock to the labor supply, θt, affects the intratemporal tradeoff between leisure
and consumption. It is assumed to evolve as
ln(θt) = (1− ρθ) ln(θ) + ρθ ln(θt−1) + σθεθ,t (3.3)
with εθ,t ∼ N (0, 1) .
The intertemporal preference shock aims to capture exogenous fluctuations in
preferences due to changes in beliefs or in taste. In particular, the stochastic discount
factor fluctuates endogenously with consumption and exogenously with the shock bt,
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which is given by
ln(bt) = ρb ln(bt−1) + σbεb,t (3.4)
where εb,t ∼ N (0, 1).
Finally, as usual in the literature, I have assumed log-utility in consumption so
that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is linear in
the former, which is necessary to ensure the existence of a balanced growth path.
3.3.2 Retailers
The retail sector is populated by infinitely lived and perfectly competitive firms pro-
ducing final goods, Yt, by combining a continuum of intermediate goods, Yt(s). Final
goods can be used for consumption and investment. Intermediate goods are trans-
formed into final goods by means of a [24] aggregator.
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
(Yt(s))
1
1+λt
]1+λt
(3.5)
where λt is the markup shock and
1+λt
λt
measures the elasticity of substitution between
differentiated intermediate goods. I assume that the markup evolves as follows
ln(λt) = (1− ρλ) ln(λ?) + ρλ ln(λt−1) + σλελ,t (3.6)
where ελ,t ∼ N (0, 1) and λ? stands for the value of the markup at the steady state.
Final goods firms take the prices of intermediate goods as given and choose Yt(s)
to minimize costs, given by
∫ 1
0
Pt(s)Yt(s)ds subject to the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator.
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From the first-order condition, I have that the demand function for the sth interme-
diate good is given by
Yt(s) =
[
Pt
Pt(s)
] 1+λt
λt
Yt (3.7)
Integrating the above and imposing the zero-profit condition, I obtain the following
expression for the aggregate price index
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(s)
−1/λtds
]−λt
(3.8)
3.3.3 Intermediate goods sector
There is a continuum of infinitely lived producers of intermediate goods, indexed by
s ∈ [0, 1], operating under monopolistic competition. They produce intermediate
inputs, Yt(s), combining labor, Ht, and capital services, kt, using a Cobb-Douglas
technology. Labor services are obtained from households and capital services from
entrepreneurs.
Yt (s) = [Za,tHt (s)]
1−α kt (s)
α (3.9)
where Za,t stands for the neutral technology shock that evolves as follows
log (Za,t) = Υz + log (Za,t−1) + σZεZ,t (3.10)
Υz is the average growth rate of the economy and Z,t ∼ N (0, 1).
Intermediate goods producers solve a two-stage problem. First, they decide on the
demand schedule for labor and capital services by minimizing total costs conditional
on factor prices. The optimization problem is given by
min
Ht(s),kt(s)
Wt
Pt
Ht (s) + r
k
t kt (s) (3.11)
41
subject to
Yt (s) = [Za,tHt (s)]
1−α kt (s)
α
where rkt is the rental rate of capital. Therefore, the optimal capital-to-labor ratio is
given by
kt(s)
Ht(s)
=
α
1− α
Wt/Pt
rkt
and the real marginal cost by
χt(s) =
(
α
1− α
)1−α(
1
α
)α (Wt/Pt)1−α (rkt )α
Za,t
Given that both the optimal capital-to-labor ratio and the real marginal cost depend
only on market prices, common parameters across intermediate producers, and the
economy-wide neutral technology shock, I conclude that those two variables are iden-
tical for all producers. Hence, I can proceed by assuming a representative agent in
the sector.
In the second stage, intermediate goods producers face a pricing problem in a
sticky price framework a` la Calvo. At any given period, a producer is allowed to
reoptimize her price with probability (1− ξp). For simplicity, let us assume that
those firms that do not re-optimize set their price equal to their last optimized price.
When reoptimization is possible, an intermediate firm s will set the price P ?t (s) that
maximizes the expected value of the firm
max
P ?t (s)
Et
∞∑
j=0
[
ξjpΛt,t+j
(
P ?t (s)
Pt+j
− χt+j
)
Yt+j(s)
]
(3.12)
subject to
Yt(s) =
[
Pt(s)
Pt
]− 1+λt
λt
Yt (3.13)
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where Λt,j is the stochastic discount factor between t and t+ j for households.
Given that not all retailers are allowed to adjust their prices, the aggregate price
index is given by the following weighted average
Pt = [ξpP
1/λt
t−1 + (1− ξp)(P ?t (s))1/λt ]λt (3.14)
3.3.4 Capital producers
Capital producers are infinitely lived agents operating in a perfectly competitive mar-
ket. Capital producers produce new physical capital stock, Kt+1, combining final
goods, It, with currently installed capital, Kt, using a constant returns to scale tech-
nology. The new capital is sold to entrepreneurs at price P kt . I assume that one
unit of time t investment delivers ζt units of time t + 1 physical capital. ζt is the
investment-specific technology shock along the lines of [36].
ln(ζt) = ρζ,1 ln(ζt−1) + σζεζ,t εζ,t ∼ N (0, 1) (3.15)
I assume that capital producers repurchase used capital from entrepreneurs. Since
previously installed capital is an input for the production of new physical capital,
the marginal rate of transformation between old (conveniently depreciated) and new
capital is equal to one. This implies that the price of old and new capital is identical.
[5] assume there are increasing marginal adjustment costs in the production of
capital, so that they can obtain time variation in the price of capital. Such a variation
contributes to the volatility of entrepreneurial net worth. In my set-up, I can obtain
time variation in the price of capital through the investment-specific technology shock.
However, I assume adjustment costs to impute some discipline in the volatility of
investment. I follow [10] in assuming that capital producers are subject to quadratic
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capital adjustment costs specified as
[
ξ
2
(
It
Kt
− (Z∗ − 1 + δ)
)2
Kt
]
, where Z∗ is the
growth rate of the economy in the steady state.
The representative capital producer chooses the level of investment that maximizes
her profits, which are given by1
P kt ζtIt − PtIt − Pt
ξ
2
(
It
Kt
− (Z∗ − 1 + δ)
)2
Kt (3.16)
Let Qt =
Pkt
Pt
be the relative price of capital,
Qt =
1
ζt
[
1 + ξ
(
It
Kt
− (Z∗ − 1 + δ)
)]
(3.17)
which is the standard Tobin’s q equation. In the absence of capital adjustment costs,
the relative price for capital, Qt, is equal to the inverse of the investment-specific
shock. The quantity and price of capital are determined in the market for capital. The
supply of capital is given by equation (3.17). The demand curve will be determined
by the entrepreneurial sector (equation 3.20).
The aggregate capital stock of the economy evolves according to
Kt = (1− δ)Kt + ζtIt (3.18)
3.3.5 Entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries
Entrepreneurs are finitely lived risk-neutral agents who borrow funds captured by
financial intermediaries from households. Borrowing and lending occur in equilib-
rium because entrepreneurs and households are two different types of agents. As I
1Note that one unit of t+ 1 capital is produced by the following technology (1− δ)Kt + ζIt. Old
capital is bought at price P kt . Therefore, the cost term cancels out the revenue term.
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have stated above, financial rigidities arise because there is asymmetric information
between borrowers and lenders. While entrepreneurs can freely observe the realiza-
tion of their idiosyncratic risk, financial intermediaries must pay an auditing cost to
observe it. To minimize monitoring costs, lenders will audit borrowers only when
they report their inability to pay the loan back under the terms of the contract. I
assume that the auditing technology is such that, when monitoring occurs, the lender
perfectly observes the borrower’s realized return. Monitoring or bankruptcy costs
are associated with accounting and legal fees, asset liquidation, and interruption of
business.
Since financial intermediaries may incur these costs in the event of default by
a borrower, loans are made at a premium over the risk-free interest rate. Such an
external finance premium captures the efficiency of financial intermediation. The
external finance premium is affected by two channels: the balance-sheet channel and
the information channel. The balance-sheet channel implies that as the share of
capital investment funded through external financing increases, the probability of
default also rises. Lenders request compensation for the higher exposure to risk
with a higher premium. The information channel is linked to the elasticity of the
external finance premium with respect to the entrepreneurial leverage ratio. This
channel states that the larger the rents generated by asymmetric information, the
more sensitive the premium is to the leverage ratio. Therefore, the external finance
premium is an increasing function of the level of financial rigidity, which is measured
by the agency cost. I enrich the model by introducing financial shocks affecting both
the balance-sheet and the information channels of the external finance premium.
In a costly state verification set-up, entrepreneurs try to avoid the financial con-
straint by accumulating wealth. However, the assumption of a finite lifetime implies
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that financial intermediation is necessary; that is, entrepreneurs cannot be fully self-
financed. In addition, the deceased fraction, γ, of the population of borrowers trans-
fers wealth to the pool of active entrepreneurs. This transfer of resources guarantees
that any active entrepreneur has nonzero wealth so she can gain access to external
financing.
Individual entrepreneur’s problem
Entrepreneurs own the capital stock, Kt, of the economy. At the beginning of the
period, an entrepreneur is hit by an idiosyncratic shock, ωjt , that affects the pro-
ductivity of her capital holdings. This idiosyncratic shock is at the center of the
informational asymmetry, since it is only freely observed by the entrepreneur. For
tractability purposes, I assume ωjt , for all j, is i.i.d lognormal with c.d.f. F (ω),
parameters µω and σω, such that E[ωj] = 1. After observing the realization of the
idiosyncratic shock, entrepreneurs choose the capital utilization rate, ujt , that solves
the following optimization problem
max
ujt
[
ujtr
k,j
t − a
(
ujt
)]
ωjtK
j
t (3.19)
where, around the steady state, a (·) = 0, a′ (·) > 0, a′′ (·) > 0 and u? = 1. Therefore,
capital services, kjt , rented to intermediate goods producers are given by k
j
t = u
j
tω
j
tK
j
t .
The capital demand for entrepreneur j is given by her expected gross returns on
holding one unit of capital from t to t+ 1
Et
[
Rk,jt+1
]
= Et
[
rk,jt+1 + ω
j
t+1(1− δ)Qt+1
Qt
]
(3.20)
where ωjt+1(1− δ)Qt+1 is the return to selling the undepreciated capital stock back to
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capital producers.
As I pointed out before, I can write the equilibrium conditions for intermediate
goods producers in terms of aggregate variables. Therefore, I have
rk,jt = ω
j
t
αχt(s)Yt(s)
kt(s)
= ωjt
αχtYt
kt
= ωjt r
k
t
and, hence,
Et
[
Rk,jt+1
]
= Et
[
ωjt+1R
k
t+1
]
(3.21)
where Rkt+1 is the aggregate gross return on capital.
Debt contract
Conditional on survival, an entrepreneur j purchases physical capital, Kjt+1, at relative
price Qt. An entrepreneur can finance the purchasing of new physical capital investing
her own net worth, N jt+1, and using external financing, B
j
t+1, to leverage her project.
Therefore, she can finance her investment in capital goods as follows:
QtK
j
t+1 = B
j
t+1 +N
j
t+1 (3.22)
Given that the entrepreneur is risk neutral, she offers a debt contract that ensures
the lender a return free of aggregate risk. The lender can diversify idiosyncratic risks
by holding a perfectly diversified portfolio. A debt contract is characterized by a
triplet consisting of the amount of the loan, Bjt+1, the contractual rate, Z
j
t+1, and a
schedule of state-contingent threshold values of the idiosyncratic shock, ω¯jn,t+1, where
n refers to the state of nature. For values of the idiosyncratic productivity shock
above the threshold, the entrepreneur is able to repay the lender at the contractual
rate. For values below the threshold, the borrower defaults, and the lender steps in
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and seizes the firm’s assets. A fraction of the realized entrepreneurial revenue is lost
in the process of liquidating the firm. In this case, the financial intermediary obtains
(1− µt+1)ωjn,t+1Rkn,t+1QtKjt+1 (3.23)
where ωjn,t+1R
k
n,t+1 stands for the ex post gross return on capital for a given en-
trepreneur j (see equation 3.21) and µt+1 for the marginal bankruptcy cost. In the
literature, the marginal bankruptcy cost is assumed to be a constant parameter. I
assume, however, that it is a drifting parameter so that exogenous changes in the level
of financial rigidities affect the business cycle properties of the model. In section 3.3.5,
I describe in detail the relevance of this assumption and the stochastic specification
chosen.
For a given state n, the threshold value for the idiosyncratic productivity shock is
defined as
ω¯jt+1R
k
t+1QtK
j
t+1 = Z
j
t+1B
j
t+1 (3.24)
where Zjt+1 is the contractual rate whose dynamics, ceteris paribus, are governed by
those of ω¯jt+1. Hence, I set up the debt contract only in terms of the idiosyncratic
productivity threshold. From this equation, I can determine the payoffs for the bor-
rower and lender as a function of the realized idiosyncratic risk. If ωjt+1 ≥ ω¯jt+1, then
the entrepreneur can satisfy the terms of the contract. She pays the lender Zjt+1B
j
t+1
and keeps
(
ωjt+1R
k
t+1QtKt+1 − Zjt+1Bjt+1
)
. If ωjt+1 < ω¯
j
t+1, the entrepreneur declares
bankruptcy; that is, she defaults on her loans. In this case, the financial intermediary
liquidates the firm, obtaining (1− µt+1)ωjt+1Rkt+1QtKt+1 and leaving the lender with
zero wealth.
The terms of the debt contract are chosen to maximize expected entrepreneurial
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profits conditional on the return of the lender, for each possible state of nature, being
equal to the real riskless rate. That is, the participation constraint is given by the
zero profit condition for the financial intermediary.
max
{ω¯jn,t+1,Kjt+1}
∑
n
Ξn
[∫ ∞
ω¯jn,t+1
ωdF (ω)− [1− F (ω¯jn,t+1)] ω¯jn,t+1
]
Rkn,t+1QtK
j
t+1 (3.25)
st ([
1− F (ω¯jn,t+1)
]
ω¯jn,t+1 + (1− µt+1)
∫ ω¯jn,t+1
0
ωdF (ω)
)
Rkn,t+1QtK
j
t+1
= Rt
(
QtK
j
t+1 −N jt+1
)
(3.26)
where Ξn stands for the probability of reaching state n, F
(
ω¯jn,t+1
)
is the default prob-
ability, Rt
(
QtK
j
t+1 −N jt+1
)
is the cost of funds, (1−µt+1)
∫ ω¯jn,t+1
0 ωR
k
n,t+1QtK
j
t+1dF (ω)
is the payoff if the entrepreneur defaults on the loan, and
[
1− F (ω¯jn,t+1)
]
ω¯jn,t+1R
k
n,t+1
QtK
j
t+1, which is equal to
[
1− F (ω¯jn,t+1)
]
Zjt+tB
j
t+1, stands for the revenue if the loan
pays. Therefore, the left-hand side in equation (3.26) is the expected gross return on
a loan for the financial intermediary.
Let %jt+1 =
Bjt+1
Njt+1
be the debt-to-wealth ratio, Γ(ω¯jt+1) =
∫ ω¯jt+1
0
ωf(ω)dω + ω¯t
∫∞
ω¯jt+1
f(ω)dω, the expected share of gross entrepreneurial earnings going to the lender,
1 − Γ(ω¯jt+1), the share of gross entrepreneurial earnings retained by borrowers, and
µt+1G(ω¯
j
t+1) = µt+1
∫ ω¯jt+1
0
ωf(ω)dω, the expected monitoring costs. Then I can rewrite
the standard debt contract problem as
max
{ω¯jn,t+1,%jt+1}
∑
n
Ξn{
[
1− Γ (ω¯jn,t+1)] Rkn,t+1Rt (1 + %jt+1)
+Ψ
(
ω¯jn,t+1
) [Rkn,t+1
Rt
[
Γ
(
ω¯jn,t+1
)− µt+1G (ω¯jn,t+1)] (1 + %jt+1)− %jt+1
]
}
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where Ψ
(
ω¯jn,t+1
)
is the Lagrange multiplier linked to the participation constraint.
From the first-order condition with respect to the debt-to-wealth ratio
0 = Et
[(
1− Γ (ω¯jt+1)) Rkt+1Rt + ψ (ω¯jt+1)
([
Γ
(
ω¯jt+1
)− µt+1G (ω¯jt+1)] Rkt+1Rt − 1
)]
,
I can conclude that the schedule of threshold values for the idiosyncratic productivity
shock depends upon aggregate variables so that it is common for all entrepreneurs.
I can proceed, hence eliminating the superscript in ωt+1. From the participation
constraint for the financial intermediary, it directly follows that the debt-to-wealth
ratio, %jt+1, is identical for all j. Therefore, I perform the remainder of the analysis
dropping all superscripts.
I derive the supply for loans from the zero profit condition for the financial inter-
mediary
Rkt+1
Rt
[Γ(ω¯t+1)− µt+1G(ω¯t+1)] =
(
QtKt+1 −Nt+1
QtKt+1
)
(3.27)
The above states that the external finance premium, Et
[
Rkt+1
Rt
]
, is an increasing
function of the debt-to-assets ratio and of the severity of the agency problem between
borrowers and lenders. Equation (3.27) provides one of the foundations of the financial
accelerator mechanism: a linkage between the entrepreneur’s financial position and
the cost of external funds, which ultimately affects the demand for capital.
The other main component of the financial accelerator is the evolution of en-
trepreneurial net worth. Note that the return on capital and, hence, the demand
for capital by entrepreneurs depends on the dynamics of net worth. Let Vt be en-
trepreneurial equity and W et be the wealth transfers made by exiting firms to the pool
of active firms. Then, aggregate entrepreneurial net worth (average net worth across
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entrepreneurs) is given by the following differential equation
Nt+1 = xtγVt +W
e
t
= xtγ
[
RktQt−1Kt −Rt−1Bt − µtRktQt−1Kt
∫ ω¯t
0
ωf(ω)dω
]
+W et
= xtγ
[
RktQt−1Kt −Rt−1Bt − µtG (ω¯t)RktQt−1Kt
]
+W et
where xt is a wealth shock,
[
RktQt−1K
j
t −Rt−1Bt
]
is the gross return on capital net of
repayment of loans in the nondefault case, and µtG (ω¯t)R
k
tQt−1Kt is the gross return
lost in case of bankruptcy. Therefore, equity stakes for entrepreneurs that survive to
period t are given by the aggregate return on capital net of repayment of loans.
Wealth shocks can be interpreted as shocks to the stock market that generate
asset price movements that cannot be accounted for by fundamentals. [16] suggest
that shocks to entrepreneurial wealth capture the so-called irrational exuberance. I
can also consider wealth shocks as a reduced form for changes in fiscal policy that
have redistributive effects between firms and households. Exogenously driven changes
in the valuation of entrepreneurial equity need to be financed by another sector of
my model economy. I assume that the household sector receives (provides) wealth
transfers from (to) the entrepreneurial sector, which are defined as
Transt = Nt+1 − γVt −W et = γVt (xt − 1) (3.28)
where γVt + W
e
t is the value that entrepreneurial equity would have taken if there
were no wealth shocks.
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Financial shocks
In a model with informational asymmetries, financing capital acquisitions with inter-
nally generated funds is preferred to external borrowing since it is less costly. The
difference between external and internal financing is the so-called external finance
premium. In my environment, this premium is defined as the expected discounted
return to capital
Et
[
Rkt+1
Rt
]
= Et
[(
1
Γ (ω¯t+1)− µt+1G (ω¯t+1)
)(
QtKt+1 −Nt+1
QtKt+1
)]
(3.29)
The external finance premium is determined by two channels: the balance-sheet
channel, through the debt-to-assets ratio
QtKt+1 −Nt+1
QtKt+1
,
and the information channel, through the elasticity of the external finance premium
with respect to the leverage ratio, which is given by
1
Γ (ω¯t+1)− µt+1G (ω¯t+1)
The external finance premium is the key relationship of the financial accelerator, since
it determines the efficiency of the contractual relationship between borrowers and
lenders. I enrich the theoretical framework by assuming that this essential mechanism
is affected exogenously by two financial shocks: a wealth shock and a shock to the
marginal bankruptcy cost.
The balance-sheet channel states the negative dependence of the premium on the
amount of collateralized net worth, Nt+1. The higher the stake of a borrower in the
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project, the lower the premium over the risk-free rate required by the intermediary.
I introduce shocks to this channel through an entrepreneurial equity shifter. These
types of wealth shocks were first introduced by [32]. Recently, they have been explored
by [17], [53], and [33].
Recently, [23] has explored shocks to the elasticity of the risk premium with respect
to the entrepreneurial leverage ratio. He solves the model discarding the contribution
of the dynamics of the idiosyncratic productivity threshold to the dynamics of the re-
maining variables.2 Hence, those shocks can refer to shocks to the standard deviation
of the entrepreneurial distribution, to agency costs paid by financial intermediaries to
monitor entrepreneurs, and/or to the entrepreneurial default threshold. He cannot,
however, discriminate among the sources of the shock. [17] solve the model com-
pletely so that they can introduce a specific type of shock affecting the efficiency of
the lending activity. In particular, they propose riskiness shocks affecting the stan-
dard deviation of the entrepreneurial distribution. A positive shock to the volatility
of the idiosyncratic productivity shock widens the distribution so that financial in-
termediaries find it more difficult to distinguish the quality of entrepreneurs.
I introduce exogenous disturbances affecting the elasticity of the premium with re-
spect to the leverage ratio by assuming the marginal bankruptcy cost is time-variant.
The information channel, therefore, establishes that the external finance premium is
a positive function of the severity of the agency problem measured by the marginal
bankruptcy cost, µt. An increase in the level of financial rigidity implies an enlarge-
ment of the informational asymmetry rents which translates into a higher premium on
external funds. To the best of my knowledge, only [48] have explored time variation
2[5] perform simulation exercises under a parameterization that implied a negligible contribution
of the dynamics of the cutoff. However, most of the contributions to the financial accelerator
literature have adopted this result as a feature of the model. Therefore, they proceed by setting
those dynamics to zero.
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along this margin. They estimate a partial equilibrium version of the BGG model
using a panel of 900 US nonfinancial firms over the period 1997:1 to 2003:3. They find
evidence of significant time variation in the marginal bankruptcy cost. In particular,
they conclude that time variation in the parameter of interest is the main driver of
the swings in the model-implied external finance premium. I assume that the shock
to entrepreneurial wealth follows the following process
ln(xt) = ρx ln(xt−1) + σxεx,t, εx,t ∼ N (0, 1) (3.30)
and the shock to the marginal bankruptcy cost
ln(µt) = (1− ρµ) ln(µ?) + ρµ ln(µt−1) + σµεµ,t, εµ,t ∼ N (0, 1) (3.31)
The unconditional mean of the process governing the agency problem between bor-
rowers and lenders, µ?, determines the average level of financial rigidity in the model
economy. This parameter governs, then, the size of the financial accelerator. In
particular, µ? stands for the steady-state level of the marginal bankruptcy cost.
3.3.6 Government
Government spending is financed by government nominal bonds sold to households
and by lump-sum taxes.
NBt+1 + PtTt = PtGt +R
n
t−1NBt (3.32)
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where the process for public spending Gt is given by Gt = gYt, with the government
spending-to-output ratio, g, being constant. The monetary authority follows a Taylor-
type interest rate rule. I assume the authority adjusts the short-term nominal interest
rate responding to deviations of inflation and output growth from the target, i.e., their
steady-state values.
(
Rnt
Rn?
)
=
(
Rnt−1
Rn?
)ρR ( pit
pi?
)(1−ρR)ψpi (∆Yt
Υz
)(1−ρR)ψy
eσRεR,t (3.33)
with ρR > 0, (1 − ρR)ψpi > 0, (1 − ρR)ψy > 0, and εR,t ∼ N (0, 1). If ψpi > 1, then
monetary policy is consistent with stabilizing inflation. If ψy > 0, then monetary
policy is consistent with stabilizing output growth.
3.3.7 Competitive equilibrium
Definition 3.1. A competitive equilibrium is defined by a sequence of prices
{Pt, Pt(s),Wt, Rt, Rkt , Rnt , Qt, Zt+1}∞t=0,
decisions rules for
{Ct, NBt, Dt+1, Ht, It, Yt(s), Yt, ut, Kt+1}∞t=0,
and laws of motion for {Nt+1, Kt+1}∞t=0 such that all of the above optimality conditions
are satisfied, the monetary authority follows its policy rule, and all markets clear.
Let us state here the final goods market clearing condition (total resources con-
straint)
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + a (ut)Kt + µtG(ω¯t)R
k
tQt−1Kt (3.34)
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and the credit market clearing condition
Dt+1 = Bt+1 = QtKt+1 −Nt+1 (3.35)
3.4 Structural Breaks in Parameters
Traditional approaches to the Great Moderation have focused on two explanations for
the slowdown in real and nominal volatilities: smaller shocks hitting the US economy
and tougher reaction to inflation by the monetary authority. Those two hypotheses
are, however, insufficient to account for the empirical evidence since the mid 1980s.
On the one hand, smaller shocks cannot account for more volatile financial cycles.
On the other hand, it is hard to reconcile that better monetary policy translates
into more stable real and nominal cycles and a destabilization of the financial cycle.
Among other researchers, [42] highlight the potential relevance of changes in the US
financial system to account for the contemporaneous divergence of volatility patterns.
In this paper, I test the relative role that changes in the size of the shocks hitting
the economy, changes in monetary policy, and changes in the financial system played
in the two stages of the Financial Immoderation and the Great Moderation. To do so,
I allow for structural breaks in three sets of parameters intimately linked to each of
these potential explanations: variance of the innovations, monetary policy coefficients,
and the average level of financial rigidity. I use, however, a relatively na¨ıve approach in
treating structural breaks. I assume economic agents do not face an inference problem
to learn endogenously about the regimes. When forming rational expectations about
the dynamic economy, they take regime changes as completely exogenous events and
assume that the current regime will last forever. Thus, once a structural break in
parameters happens, agents learn about it immediately and conveniently readjust
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their choices. This simplifying assumption facilitates the estimation when, as in my
case, breaks in the steady state of the economy are allowed.
In this section, I first discuss how breaks in parameters affect the system matrices
of the state space representation of the solution to the linear rational expectations
(LRE) model. The system of log-linearized equilibrium conditions can be represented
as
Γ0 (%) s˜t = Γ1 (%) s˜t−1 + Ψ (%) εt + Π (%) ηt (3.36)
where s˜t is a vector of model variables expressed in deviations from steady state,
εt is a vector of exogenous shocks, ηt is a vector of rational expectations errors with
elements ηxt = x˜t−Et−1 [x˜t], and % is the vector of structural parameters. The solution
to the LRE model can be cast in state space form as
Transition equations : st = [I − Φ(%)] s¯+ Φ(%)st−1 + Φε(%)εt (3.37)
Measurement equations : yt = B(%)st (3.38)
where st = s˜t + ln(s¯) and s¯ is the state vector evaluated in the steady state. Breaks
in any parameter affect %. However, while changes in monetary policy affect Φ(%)
and variations in the size of exogenous shocks shift Φε(%), structural breaks in the
average level of financial rigidities have an impact on Φ(%) and s¯. That is, changes in
µ? not only affect the coefficient matrices but also the steady state of the economy.
This poses a challenge in the estimation exercise, since I need to conveniently adapt
the filter used to evaluate the likelihood of the data.
In the remainder of the section, I discuss how structural breaks in the parameters
of my choice help the model to account for the empirical evidence. For example, in my
theoretical framework, an increase (decrease) in the size of a disturbance generates a
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nonnegative (nonpositive) change in the volatility of all model variables. Therefore,
an enlargement in the variability of the shocks hitting the economy could account for
the empirical evidence of the 1970s and early 1980s since the volatility of all variables
of interest moved in the same direction.
Recent US economic history highlights the relevance of monetary policy to the
level and stability of inflation. That is, changes in the degree of response to objec-
tives by the monetary authority will have a larger impact in shaping nominal cycles.
In particular, I should expect a loosening of the monetary authority’s reaction to
deviations of inflation from the target during the Burns-Miller era and a tightening
in the Volcker-Greenspan era.
Changes in the average level of bankruptcy costs imply changes in the level of
financial frictions due to asymmetric information. An increase (decrease) in the av-
erage marginal bankruptcy cost enhances (weakens) the transmission of exogenous
shocks to entrepreneurial wealth and costs of capital. Consequently, the responses
of investment and output to shocks are more active (muted), since the sensitivity of
borrowing costs to leverage increases (decreases). Given that the 1960s, 1970s, and
early 1980s were years of profound changes in the US financial system, I should expect
a decrease in the unconditional average of the level of financial rigidities in the model
economy.
3.5 Parameter Estimates
I estimate the model with standard Bayesian estimation techniques using eight macroe-
conomic quarterly US time series as observable variables: the growth rate of real per
capita net worth in the nonfarm business sector, the growth rate of real per capita
gross value added (GVA) by the nonfarm business sector, the growth rate of real per
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capita consumption defined as nondurable consumption and services, the growth rate
of real per capita investment defined as gross private investment, log hours worked,
the log of labor share, the log difference of the GVA deflator, and the federal funds
rate. A complete description of the data set is given in Appendix 4.4. The model is
estimated over the full sample period from 1954.4 to 2006.4.
All the series enumerated above except net worth in the nonfarm business sector
are standard in the data sets used in the empirical macro literature. I discuss in further
detail the inclusion of such financial variable in my set of observable variables. My
theoretical framework describes the evolution of three financial series: entrepreneurial
wealth, debt, and the external finance premium. Therefore, the estimation exercise
could aim to match the behavior of all of those. Net worth for a firm is generally
defined as total assets minus total liabilities. However, in order to be consistent with
the model, I define net worth as tangible assets minus credit market liabilities. First,
the model is a model of tangible assets purchased by firms so that it has nothing to say
about financial assets held by entrepreneurs. Second, external financing in the model
relates only to that obtained in credit markets. Hence, I do not consider trade and
taxes payable nor miscellaneous liabilities provided in the Flow of Funds Accounts.
An alternative measure for entrepreneurial wealth used by [17] is stock market data.
This measure contains information only for publicly traded firms, which are a smaller
set of firms than the one linked to the aggregate macroeconomic variables of my data
set. In addition, in my model there is no role for equity finance.
Following the reasoning provided in the previous paragraph, my definition of debt
is given by credit market liabilities in the nonfarm business sector. This information
is contained in the series for entrepreneurial wealth. Therefore, if I am to consider
only one financial variable in my empirical analysis, it seems reasonable to include
net worth, since its informational content includes that of the dynamics of debt.
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The external finance premium is essentially an unobservable variable. Hence, any
empirical counterpart to be used in the estimation exercise is a proxy for the model
concept of interest. [5] suggest considering the prime lending rate and the 6-month
Treasury bill rate in defining the external finance premium. [16] define the external
finance premium as the premium on Baa bonds. Recently, [33] have used individual
security-level data to construct a corporate credit spread index. They use such a
credit spread as a proxy for the fluctuations in the unobservable external finance
premium. I refrain from using a proxy for the external finance premium for several
reasons. First, constructing a measure for such a variable using individual firm data
is beyond the scope of this paper. Second, I focus on the analysis of the nonfarm
business sector, which includes both corporate and noncorporate US firms. Therefore,
using corporate credit or bond spreads and real variables for the nonfarm business
sector introduces a discrepancy between financial and macroeconomic variables that
would make it harder to evaluate the goodness of fit of my analysis. Third, in my
theoretical framework, external financing is modeled using a simple debt contract.
However, as long as it is the only form of external financing, the external finance
premium is interpreted in the literature (see De Graeve, 2008) as pertaining to all
forms of external finance. Therefore, there is no choice of approximation to this model
variable that is free of controversy.
3.5.1 Prior distribution of the parameters
In this section, I discuss the prior information on the parameters used in the estima-
tion exercise (see Table 26). First, I provide a thorough description of my prior choice
for the parameters linked to the financial accelerator. Then, I discuss the priors on
the remaining parameters. My prior choice for these parameters is fairly standard in
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the literature. I use identical priors across subsamples for those parameters subject to
structural breaks. I let the data speak about the size of the structural break without
imposing any additional a priori information.
As is standard in the literature, I use degenerate priors on the default probability,
F (ω¯), and the survival probability, γ. [3] report historical default rates for US bonds
over the period 1971-2005 and deliver an average equal to 3%. This is the value for
the annual default rate widely used in the literature on the financial accelerator to pin
down the quarterly default probability. I obtain the survival probability, γ, from the
steady state of the economy given that I set the debt-to-wealth ratio to its historical
average. The value for γ is 98.54%, which implies that firms live, on average, 17
years. This tenure is close to the median tenure reported by [48] from a panel of 900
nonfinancial firms.
Conversely, I use an informative prior for the unconditional average of finan-
cial rigidity, µ?. Such a parameter captures the steady state value of the marginal
bankruptcy cost. Therefore, it must lie inside the unit interval. A beta distribution
guarantees that the parameter of interest belongs to the 0-1 interval. In order to
determine the location parameter of the beta prior distribution, I consider micro evi-
dence on bankruptcy costs. [2], using data from 26 firms, concludes that bankruptcy
costs are about 20% of the firm’s value prior to bankruptcy and in the range 11-17%
of firm’s value up to three years prior to bankruptcy. [1] analyze 201 firms that com-
pleted Chapter 11 bankruptcies during the period 1982-1993 to determine that the
mean liquidation costs are 36.5%. Using those two results, [8] conclude that the in-
terval empirically relevant for the marginal bankruptcy cost parameter is [0.20, 0.37].
[48] estimate a partial equilibrium version of the model by [5] using panel data over
the period 1997 to 2003. As a byproduct of their estimation, they obtain the model
implied time series for the marginal bankruptcy cost. Their estimates lie in the range
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of 7% to 45%. Therefore, I assume the beta distribution for the unconditional average
level of financial rigidity is centered at 0.28. I choose the diffusion parameter to be
equal to 0.05 so that the 95% credible set, [0.13, 0.41], encompasses most of the values
provided in the literature.
My priors on the autoregressive coefficients of the stochastic exogenous processes
are beta distributions with mean 0.6 and standard deviation 0.1. The priors on the
innovations’ standard deviations are quite diffuse. In particular, I assume inverse
gamma distributions centered at 0.01 with 4 degrees of freedom. The covariance
matrix of the innovations is diagonal.
Following [56], I assume Gaussian priors on the monetary policy coefficients. I
center the prior for the response of the monetary authority to deviations of inflation
from the target at 1.50. I consider a diffuse enough prior by setting the standard
deviation equal to 0.35. The coefficient governing the response to deviations of output
growth from the target is assumed to be Normal, around a mean 0.5 with standard
deviation 0.1. The persistence of the monetary policy rule is assumed to follow a beta
distribution, with mean 0.6 and standard deviation 0.2.
I assume Gaussian priors for Υz and log(H
?) centered at zero and at its empirical
historical average respectively and with standard error of 0.01. I use a diffuse gamma
distribution for the net annualized inflation rate in the steady state with mean 3 and
standard deviation 1. I assume that the capital share in the Cobb-Douglas production
function, α, is described by a normal distribution with mean 0.3 and standard devia-
tion 0.05. The price markup at the steady state follows a beta distribution centered
at 0.15 and standard deviation of 0.02. I choose a beta distribution for the Calvo
parameter with a location parameter equal to 0.75 and dispersion of 0.1. The capital
adjustment cost parameter is assumed to follow a gamma distribution with location
and diffusion parameters equal to 2 and 1, respectively. The gamma prior for the
62
Frisch elasticity is centered at the balance growth path of ν = 2, but I consider a
disperse prior by setting its standard deviation to 1. The habit parameter is assumed
to have a beta distribution with mean 0.6 and standard deviation 0.1. The elastic-
ity of capital adjustment costs follows a gamma centered at 0.5 and with standard
deviation 0.3.
Finally, three more parameters are fixed in the estimation procedure: government
spending share, depreciation rate, and discount rate. The exogenous government
spending to GVA ratio is set to the historical average g? = 0.20. The depreciation
rate, δ, is set to 0.025 so that the annual depreciation rate is 10%. The value for
households’ discount rate, β, is chosen so that, in the steady state, the nominal risk-
free interest rate matches the historical quarterly gross federal funds rate. Therefore,
β =
(1 + pi?/400) exp{Υz}
Rn?
where pi? and Υz are set equal to their observed average.
3.5.2 Posterior estimates of the parameters
The estimation procedure is as follows. First, I obtain the posterior mode by maximiz-
ing the posterior distribution, which combines the prior distribution of the structural
parameters with the likelihood of the data. By assuming εt ∼iid N (0,Σε) in equa-
tion 3.37, I can use the Kalman filter to evaluate the likelihood function. I modify the
Kalman filter to accommodate for changes in the system matrices. A full description
of the modification used in the estimation exercise is given in Appendix 4.4. Sec-
ond, I use the random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to obtain draws from the
posterior distribution. In particular, I run 3 chains of 500,000 draws using a burn-in
period of 20% of the draws.
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Tables 28 and 29 report the posterior median and the 95% credible intervals
obtained by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Let us first analyze Table 28, which
contains those parameters not allowed to change over time. Some of the estimates
are fairly standard, such as the inflation rate in the steady state, log hours in the
steady state, the average growth rate, the adjustment cost parameter, the elasticity
of capital utilization costs, the markup in the steady state, the backward looking
parameter of the monetary policy rule, and the autoregressive coefficients. The first
three parameters of the previous enumeration are close to their historical averages.
The remaining ones are close enough to the widely accepted values in the literature
so I do not discuss them further. I just highlight here that while the shock to the
information channel of the external finance premium is highly persistent, ρµ = 0.97,
the wealth shock is much less persistent, ρx = 0.52.
The posterior median estimate for the Frisch elasticity, ν = 1.03, is inside the
bounds found in the literature but slightly higher than the values obtained in DSGE
models with sticky wages. Since I have a flexible labor market, I need a large enough
Frisch elasticity to match the dynamics of hours worked. The median estimate for the
capital share, α = 0.28, lies in between the values recently obtained in the DSGE lit-
erature (Smets and Wouters, 2007 and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2009),
and the standard values used in the RBC literature.
The estimated degree of habit formation, h = 0.34, is lower than the traditional
0.60 advocated in the literature. The estimated Calvo parameter , ξ̂p = 0.40, implies
that the nominal friction is not too relevant, since firms re-optimize their prices every
six and a half months approximately. since the financial accelerator mechanism not
only amplifies but also propagates the shocks hitting the economy, I do not need a
high degree of habit formation or of nominal rigidity to match the persistence of the
data.
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Table 29 reports the estimates for those parameters allowed to change in 1970
and 1984. The first group of parameters is formed by the average level of financial
rigidity, µ?, the size of the shock to the marginal bankruptcy cost, σµ, and the size
of the neutral technology shock, σz. These three parameters are characterized by
presenting only one structural break in 1984. The neutral technology shock post-
1984 is 50% smaller than in the previous decades. The size of the structural break
estimated in 1984 implies a significant change in the nature of the process governing
agency costs.
On the one side, the estimated reduction in the size of the unconditional mean of
the process is above 75%. This result is along the lines of [42], who obtain that after
the mid 1980s, the model economy is in a virtually frictionless environment, and [21]
who estimates an 80% reduction in monitoring costs in a model based on [8]. The
reduction in the average level of financial rigidities accounts not only for the decrease
in bankruptcy costs linked to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (see White, 1983)
but also for other changes in the US financial system. The decades under analysis are
characterized by the IT revolution, waves of regulation and deregulation, development
of new products, and improvements in the assessment of risk. All these factors define
the level of financial rigidity in terms of the model economy. Therefore, the Great
Moderation period is characterized by easier access to credit, which accounted for a
reduction in µ?. On the other side, the size of the shock post-1984 is four times larger
than in the pre-1984 period. Therefore, the unconditional average of the process gov-
erning the level of financial rigidity is smaller but the variability of the disturbance to
the process is larger. I can reconcile these two results by noting that a reduction in µ?
increases the average recovery rate for financial intermediaries. Hence, intermediaries
are willing to enlarge their exposure to risk, which is captured by the increase in σµ.
The second set of parameters in Table 29 contains only the size of the shock to
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the balance-sheet channel of the external finance premium. The size of the wealth
shock is an increasing step function. Larger balance-sheet shocks affecting the model
economy reflect the increasing sensitivity of the system to asset price movements.
This result does not come as a surprise, since the US data have been characterized by
several price ”bubbles” over the last few decades: the dramatic rise in US stock prices
during the late 1990s or the housing bubble during the early 2000s, for example. One
possible interpretation of wealth shocks is that they stand for asset price changes not
driven by fundamentals.
The remaining standard deviations of innovations increase in the 1970s and de-
crease in the last sample period. The investment-specific and the intertemporal pref-
erence shock are smaller, in the post-1984 than in the pre-1970 sample period. The
post-1984 values of the monetary policy shock, the intratemporal preference shock,
and the markup shock are, however, in the same neighborhood as those taken in the
pre-1970 sample period. That is, the 1970s and early 1980s were an ”exception,” in
the sense of [7], for these parameters.
Finally, I describe the results for the monetary policy reaction function parameters.
The mean of the long-run reaction to deviations of inflation from the target is larger
than the standard values in the literature. As pointed out elsewhere in the literature,
the monetary authority chooses a looser reaction to inflation in the 1970s. Post-1984,
however, there is a tightening in the response to inflation. As long as the reaction to
inflation post-1984 is similar to the one pre-1970, I can say, in simplistic terms, that it
seems Volcker overcame Burns-Miller’s will in terms of inflation by reusing Martin’s
recipes. The monetary authority responds strongly to changes in the growth rate of
output (changes in the output gap) over the whole sample period. The authority
started to respond more tightly in the 1970s and kept that level in the post-1984 era.
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3.5.3 Model evaluation
In this section, I evaluate the model fit using two approaches. First, I provide a
relative measure of fit by performing Bayesian model comparison. Second, I assess
the absolute fit of the model using a posterior predictive check.
In Bayesian econometrics, model comparison is performed using the marginal like-
lihood of the data or marginal data density. This statistic is defined as the weighted
average of the likelihood where the weights are given by the prior
p (Y |Mi) =
∫
p (Y |%,Mi) p (%|Mi) d%
where Mi stands for model i. Table 27 reports the differences of log-marginal data
densities with respect to a model without breaks in parameters. I conclude that the
model with breaks in the three set of parameters not only outperforms with respect
to the model with no breaks but also to any partial model in which only one set
of parameters is allowed to be subject to structural breaks. Therefore, I conclude
that the data at hand are best represented by the theoretical framework that allows
for structural breaks in the size of shocks, the average level of financial rigidity, and
monetary policy coefficients.
I study the absolute model fit of the data using the posterior distribution. In
particular, I compare model-implied statistics with those as in the data. I generate
samples of the same length as the data (after a burn-in period of 100 observations)
from the model economy using 1000 posterior draws. Table 30 reports the median of
the model-implied moments and the 90% credible intervals for raw data and Table 31
that for the cyclical component.
The model overpredicts the volatility of net worth growth, consumption growth,
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and inflation across subsamples. It overpredicts the volatility of all variables except
the nominal interest rate and hours for the post-1984 period. Let us analyze the
performance of the model in accounting for relative standard deviations with respect
to the standard deviation of output growth. The model matches the relative stan-
dard deviations of net worth growth, investment growth, consumption growth, and
inflation over this period fairly well. Moreover, the model is able to generate relative
standard deviations of the magnitude of the observed ones in all sample periods of
interest. Let us analyze, for example, the relative standard deviation of the net worth
growth rate. Pre-1984 this variable is less volatile than output; post-1984 it is almost
twice as volatile. The model is able to capture such a change in relative volatilities.
Moreover, the model displays an increase in the relative volatility of net worth growth
in the 1970-1983 sample period as observed in the data. Finally, the model is able
to deliver the main characteristics of the generalized immoderation in the 1970s and
the subsequent moderation in the mid 1980s in real and nominal variables and the
additional immoderation on the financial side of the economy. The model is not able
to capture, however, the enlargement of the volatility of the raw series for hours in
the post-1984 period and the slowdown in the volatility of labor share in the 1970s.
In the literature characterizing the business cycle, model fit is performed using
the moments of the cyclical component of the variables. Therefore, I compute the
cyclical component of the observable variables in log-levels and the model-implied
series using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
The model overpredicts the volatility of net worth, labor share, and inflation and
it underpredicts that of hours for all periods. It also fails to deliver the large increase
in the cyclical volatility of output and consumption in the 1970s. The main failure is,
however, that the model delivers the result that the standard deviations for net worth
in the pre-1984 subsamples are larger than these of output. But my environment is
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successful in many other dimensions. It captures the fact that hours are less volatile
than output pre-1984 but more volatile afterwards. In accounting for the ratio of
standard deviations across subperiods, the model is even more successful than in the
case for the raw series. In particular, the model delivers changes in volatilities in
the same direction as in the data for all variables. Moreover, the magnitude of the
increases in volatility in the 1970-1983 sample period and the decreases in the last
sample period are closer to the observed ones.
I can conclude that the model proposed in this paper fits the data fairly well. It
delivers moments in consonance with the data both for the raw and filtered series.
Therefore, my model is a good candidate for analyzing the US business cycle.
3.6 Assessing the Drivers of the Financial Immod-
eration and the Great Moderation
In this section, I analyze the contribution of each of the potential candidates, size
of the shocks, monetary policy stance, and severity of financial rigidities, to the
model-implied changes in business cycle properties. To do so, I perform two sets of
counterfactual exercises: one for the first stage of the Financial Immoderation and
another for the second stage and the Great Moderation.
Counterfactuals 1-4 refer to the first stage of the Financial Immoderation. I
perform simulations using the following procedure:
1. Simulate the model economy for 200 periods (after a burn-in of 100 observations)
using the parameter vector characterizing the 1954-1969 sample period.
2. Simulate the model economy for 200 periods (after a burn-in of 100 observations)
using the parameter vector characterizing the 1970-1983 sample period.
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3. Compute the ratio of standard deviations.
4. Simulate the model economy for 200 periods (after a burn-in of 100 observations)
using the parameter vector of the counterfactual.
5. Compute the ratio of standard deviations with respect to those obtained in
step 1.
6. Compute the percentage of the ratio obtained in step 3 attributable to the
counterfactual.
7. Repeat the above 10,000 times.
8. Compute 90% credible intervals.
In Table 32, I report the observed and model-implied ratios of standard deviations
of the cyclical component. The first three columns focus on the comparison between
the 1954-1969 and 1970-1983 sample periods. The last three columns consider the
ratio of standard deviations of the post-1984 period with respect to the 1970s and
early 1980s computed following the procedure described above. Table 33 delivers the
percentage of the total increase or decrease in standard deviation generated by the
model that can be accounted for by the corresponding counterfactual.
In Counterfactual 1, I analyze the role played by the estimated changes in 1970 in
the response of the monetary authority to deviations of inflation and output growth
from the target. In particular, I simulate the model economy as described above,
using a parameter vector with the same entries as the one characterizing the 1954-1969
sample period but with the monetary policy coefficients of the 1970-1983 parameter
vector. The contemporaneous loosening in the response to inflation and the tightening
in the response to output observed in the 1970s and early 1980s account for the
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following percentages of the model-implied increase in cyclical volatility: 46% for
inflation, 32% for the nominal interest rate, 15% for labor share, 3% for hours worked,
and 5% for net worth.
In Counterfactual 2, I study the relative significance of the estimated 3% increase
in the level of financial rigidity. Such an increase in agency costs accounts for an
average of 5% of the model-implied increase in the volatility of the cyclical component
of net worth, output, investment, consumption, hours, and the nominal interest rate.
I analyze the role played by the financial shocks in the immoderation of the 1970s
and early 1980s in Counterfactual 3. The change in the size of financial shocks
accounts completely for the increase in the cyclical volatility of net worth. It also
accounts for the following percentages of the widening of business cycle fluctuations:
8% for output, 18% for investment, 6% for consumption, 6% for hours, 2% for labor
share, and 5% for the nominal interest rate.
Counterfactual 4 assesses the relative importance of changes in the remaining
shocks of the economy. The estimated changes in the size of the shocks account for
9% of the increase in the cyclical volatility of net worth, 100% of that in investment
variability, 88% of investment, 94% of consumption, 94% of hours, 83% of labor share,
40% of inflation, and 53% of the nominal interest rate.
I conclude that the change in behavior of the monetary authority explains a large
fraction of the increase in the variability of nominal variables observed in the 1970s
and early 1980s. The immoderation observed in real and financial variables is driven
by larger shocks hitting the US economy. In particular, the increase in the size of the
wealth shock suffices to deliver the increase in the cyclical volatility of net worth.
In Counterfactuals 5-8, I study the drivers of the empirical evidence of the post-
1984 sample period, which is characterized by a contemporaneous enlargement of the
financial cycle and a smoothing of real and nominal cycles. I proceed as described
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above but the baseline parameter vector is the one linked to the 1970-1983 period
and the parameter vector used in step 2 of the procedure is the one for the 1984-2006
sample period.
In Counterfactual 5, I study the relative contribution of the tightening of mon-
etary policy in response to inflation to the Great Moderation and the widening of
the financial cycle. Stricter monetary policy accounts for 41% of the model-implied
reduction in the cyclical volatility of inflation, 22% of the decrease in the variability
of the nominal interest rate, 15% of the slowdown in the volatility of labor share, and
3% of the increase in the standard deviation of the cyclical component of net worth.
It has, however, a negligible effect on the variability at business cycle frequencies of
investment, consumption, and hours.
I analyze the role played by the reduction in the unconditional average level of
financial rigidity in Counterfactual 6. A model with a smoother financial sector
accounts for 34% of the model-implied slowdown in investment and nominal interest
rate volatility. It also accounts for 9% of the decrease in the cyclical volatility of
inflation. The effect on the remaining variables is almost negligible.
I study the effect of the estimated increase in the size of financial shocks in the
mid 1980s in Counterfactual 7. It has a negligible effect on the volatility of the
labor share and inflation. However, it generates an increase in the magnitude of the
cyclical variation for the remaining variables. The most remarkable changes are the
70% increase in the volatility of investment and the 93% increase in that of net worth,
which stands for 150% of the total model-implied immoderation.
Counterfactual 8 analyzes the effect of the decrease in the size of all the remaining
shocks in the model economy. I obtain the result that smaller real and nominal shocks
overpredict the slowdown in output and the volatility of hours worked. These changes
in the size of shocks account for the fraction of the reduction in the amplitude of
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the nominal cycle not accounted for by the tightening of monetary policy and the
relaxation of financial rigidity.
From the counterfactual exercises, I conclude that the behavior of the monetary
authority has a significant impact on shaping the nominal cycle. Changes in the finan-
cial system are relevant for the variability of investment and nominal interest rates.
The remaining swings in the amplitude of fluctuations at business cycle frequencies
are driven by changes in the size of shocks hitting the economy.
3.7 Conclusions
I have studied two empirical regularities characterizing the US aggregate data over
the last 55 years. The Great Moderation is related to the significant slowdown in
the amplitude of the real and nominal cycles since the mid 1980s. The Financial
Immoderation refers to the enlargement of the cyclical volatility of financial variables
present since 1970. In this paper, I have made inference on the size of the structural
breaks in parameters needed to account for the evolution of the second moments of
the data in a model featuring nominal, real, and financial frictions. In particular, I
have focused on breaks in the size of shocks, monetary policy coefficients, and the
average size of the financial accelerator to disentangle the role played by changes in
luck, in the conduct of monetary policy, and in the financial system respectively.
I conclude that while changes in the conduct of monetary policy account for a
relevant proportion of the changes in the volatility of nominal variables, its effect
on the variability of the remaining variables is small. Financial factors are relevant
in shaping the business cycle properties of financial variables, investment, and the
nominal interest rate. The estimated reduction in the size of the financial accelerator
allows the model to account for 30% of the slowdown in the volatility of investment
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and the nominal interest rate. In the next chapter of this thesis , I illustrate the
growing relative significance of financial shocks in accounting for the variability of
these variables in detriment of technology shocks.
My study reaffirms the growing convention in the literature on integrating credit
market imperfections in otherwise standard macroeconomic models. I have docu-
mented the importance of including financial shocks in the analysis. Moreover, I
highlight the relevance of taking into account structural breaks in the data, since my
conclusions, in terms of assessing the main drivers of the cycle or characterizing the
propagation dynamics of shocks, may differ significantly.
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Chapter 4
Financial Shocks: Model Implied
versus Empirical Propagation
Dynamics
4.1 Introduction
Standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, such as [14] and
[56], abstract from interactions between credit markets and the rest of the economy.
Those models are based on the capital structure irrelevance theorem by [50]; that
is, the composition of agents’ balance sheets has no effect on their optimal decisions.
Nevertheless, episodes such as the Great Depression or the 2007-2009 financial turmoil
stand as compelling evidence of the linkage between the developments in the financial
and real sectors. Along these lines, recent contributions to the literature have focused
on incorporating credit markets in the workhorse DSGE model. For example, [5] and
[40] stress the relevance of the balance sheet’s condition in determining economic
activity. The ability to borrow depends upon borrowers’ wealth, which ultimately
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affects the demand for capital and the level of economic activity they can engage in.
Subsequent contributions to the literature on macroeconomic models with finan-
cial frictions have explored the transmission of shocks originated in the financial
sector. In the model estimated in chapter 3, I introduce two financial shocks: a shock
to business wealth and a shock to the marginal bankruptcy cost. In this chapter, I
study the relative importance of these shocks in explaining the variance of the vari-
ables of interest. I also use the estimation output to characterize the model implied
responses to financial shocks.
I conclude that the relevance of financial shocks in accounting for investment
volatility increases over time. While before the Great Moderation, technology shocks
(neutral and investment-specific) are the main drivers of investment variance, ex-
plaining more than 40%, after the mid 1980s, they account for only 24%. Financial
shocks, however, explain 42% of investment variance at business cycle frequencies in
the Great Moderation era. If I abstract from financial shocks, their relative contri-
bution to investment variability is absorbed by technology shocks. Therefore, I can
conclude that failing to include financial shocks results in an overstatement of the
relative role played by technology shocks.
The estimated reduction in the average level of financial rigidities in the mid 1980s
has important implications for the propagation mechanism of financial shocks. On the
one hand, a smaller financial accelerator induces more muted responses to financial
innovations; that is, the amplification mechanism linked to imperfections in the credit
market gets reduced. On the other hand, a reduction in financial frictions enhances
the persistence of the responses to financial shocks in the US economy.
The investment-based channel of models of the financial accelerator such as [5]
and [8] suggests that the response of investment to an expansionary (contractionary)
financial shock is positive (negative). But there is no consensus among empirical
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macro researchers on the response of consumption to financial shocks affecting firms’
ability to borrow. Using the model described in chapter 3, I obtain that expansionary
financial shocks generate different responses upon impact depending on the nature of
the financial shock. For example, a positive wealth shock delivers a negative response
upon impact for consumption, but an expansionary shock to the marginal bankruptcy
cost implies a positive response.
The negative response upon impact of consumption to a positive shock to the
value of firms could be considered as a striking implication of the model. However,
the responses of consumption and investment to a shock affecting firms’ wealth are
also of opposite signs in [17] and [53]. To the best of my knowledge, the only paper
able to deliver a positive response upon impact of consumption after a positive wealth
shock affecting the business sector is [33]. It is hard to assess which model does
actually account better for the evidence since there has not been a careful empirical
documentation of the effects of financial shocks on real variables.
In this chapter, I directly address the empirical assessment of the effects on con-
sumption of a financial shock affecting business wealth. To do so, I estimate a vec-
tor autoregressive model on consumption, investment, business wealth, and financial
spreads. I identify the financial shock using sign restrictions as proposed by [59]. I
assume that a shock to business wealth generates responses of identical sign in busi-
ness wealth and investment and of opposite sign in credit spreads. I remain silent on
the response of consumption to the financial shock since the objective of the paper is
to assess such a response.
From my empirical analysis, I conclude that the response of consumption to a
financial shock affecting business wealth is not only ambiguous, but also it may dra-
matically vary depending on the series used to measure business wealth and the
external finance premium. After a positive shock to business wealth, only 6% of the
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responses satisfying the identification restrictions imply a negative response upon im-
pact of consumption when business wealth is measured using data provided by the
Flow of Funds Accounts and the external finance premium is proxied by the corpo-
rate spread. However, 55% of the responses imply a negative response of consumption
when business wealth is measured by the industrial Dow Jones index and I use the
prime lending spread1 as the proxy for the cost of external financing for firms. More-
over, the percentage of contractionary responses of consumption to an expansionary
business wealth shock varies significantly across subsamples. However, I can state
that financial shocks can generate responses of opposite signs for investment and con-
sumption since there is no scenario under which we obtain zero negative responses
upon impact for consumption.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 4.2, I discuss the model implied
impulse response functions and the variance decomposition for the variables used in
the estimation exercise. Section 4.3 reports the empirical assessment of the effects of
financial shocks on consumption. I conclude in section 4.4.
4.2 Financial Shocks in a DSGE Model with
Financial Frictions: Relative Importance and
Propagation Dynamics
In this section, I focus on the study of the two financial shocks introduced in the
model economy of chapter 3. To do so, I analyze the variance decomposition and the
impulse response functions.
1The prime lending spread is defined as the difference between the prime lending rate and the
three-month T-bill.
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4.2.1 Variance decomposition
Table 34 indicates the variance decomposition at business cycle frequencies for output,
investment, consumption, net worth, hours worked, labor share, inflation, and the
nominal interest rate. I compute the spectral density of the observable variables
implied by the DSGE model and use an inverse difference filter to obtain the spectrum
for the level of output, investment, consumption, and net worth (see Appendix 4.4).
I define business cycle fluctuations as those corresponding to cycles between 6 and 32
quarters.
The main driver of output variance is the neutral technology shock. The relative
significance of this shock decreases over time from 67% to 39%. The markup shock
and the intratemporal shock become more relevant over time. In particular, their
contribution to the variance of output doubles from the 1954-1969 sample period
to the Great Moderation era. Since the markup shock determines the variance of
the labor share and the labor supply shifter is the main driver of the variance in
hours, I can conclude that the dynamics of output have shifted from being determined
by capital to being determined by labor services. The variance of consumption is
mainly shaped by the neutral technology shock pre-1984 but driven by a richer set
of shocks afterwards, since the largest contributor accounts only for 31% of the total
variance. Nominal interest rate variance is driven by the investment-specific shock,
the shock to the stochastic discount factor, and the wealth shock, in decreasing order
of relevance. The relative contribution of the two financial shocks increases post-1984
from accounting for 12% of the cyclical variance of the interest rate to 20%. Such an
increase in the proportion of the variance of the federal funds rate accounted for by
financial factors is taken away from the contribution of the intertemporal preference
shock. The variance of inflation is explained to a large extent by the monetary
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policy shock. This result is at odds with the standard results in the literature in
which the relative contribution of the monetary policy shock is small. One of the
usual main contributors to the variance of inflation is the markup shock. But, in
my environment, the markup shock completely drives the variance of labor share.
Therefore, the model faces a tradeoff when using the realization of the markup shock
to match up the dynamics of either the labor share or the inflation rate. In my set-up,
the model solves the issue by drawing the dynamics of the labor share through the
markup shock and the dynamics of the inflation rate using the monetary shock, which
is irrelevant for any other variable.
The cyclical variance of net worth is driven by the wealth shock. Even though the
size of the shock to the marginal bankruptcy cost increases dramatically post-1984,
the relative contribution of this shock to the variance of net worth decreases over
time.
The most remarkable entry in Table 34 is the variance decomposition of invest-
ment. First, the contribution of the investment-specific technology shock is smaller
than in the literature. This result is not just an artifact linked to the assumption of
adjustment costs in capital instead of in investment. I use the specification for the
adjustment costs proposed by [10]. However, they note that the variance of invest-
ment is explained to a large extent by the investment-specific technology shock. In
my case, the lesser relevance of the investment-specific shock is due to the presence
of financial shocks. An environment identical to the current one but without finan-
cial shocks would deliver a relative contribution of the investment shock above 50%.
In the first subsample, the contributions of the two technology shocks and the two
financial shocks are 42% and 35% respectively. In the 1970s and early 1980s, those
contributions are 49% and 26% ,respectively. Post-1984, financial shocks are the main
driver of investment variance, accounting for 42%. Technology shocks account only
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for 24% of the variance of investment.
From the above, I conclude that the relative contribution of technology shocks, in
particular, of the investment-specific technology shock, is overstated in the literature.
Once financial shocks are ain play, the contribution of technology shocks is signifi-
cantly smaller, since they no longer account for financial factors in a reduced-form
style.
4.2.2 Impulse response functions
The propagation of real and nominal shocks in the context of a model of the financial
accelerator has already been studied in the literature. Therefore, in this section, I
focus only on the study of the propagation dynamics of financial shocks. For both the
wealth shock and the innovation to the marginal bankruptcy cost, I plot the responses
in the first 40 quarters in terms of percentage deviations with respect to the steady
state. Each plot contains three impulse response functions (IRFs). The dotted line
is the IRF computed using the parameter vector characterizing the 1954-1969 sample
period. The solid line is the IRF for the 1970s and early 1980s. The dashed line is
the IRF of the post-1984 period.
Wealth shock
Figure C-1 reports the impulse response functions following a wealth shock that, upon
impact, induces an increase in entrepreneurial net worth equal to a 1% deviation from
its steady-state value. The size of the shock is constant across subsamples so I can
better analyze changes in the propagation mechanism of this financial shock. The
response upon impact for net worth is identical because of all the defining elements
of entrepreneurial wealth are predetermined when the wealth shock is realized. The
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main messages from the figure are: (i) the impulse response functions in the 1954-
1969 and 1970-1983 sample periods are almost identical for net worth, consumption,
investment, output, hours worked, and the external finance premium; (ii) responses
upon impact for all variables, except net worth, are smaller in the 1984-2006 sample
period; and (iii) the responses become more persistent post-1984.
Let us first analyze the impulse response functions for the pre-1984 sample peri-
ods. The response of net worth is very persistent, which is the source of the large
contribution of the wealth shock to the low frequency fluctuations of entrepreneurial
wealth. A positive wealth shock that increases the value of collateral reduces the
probability of default so that financial intermediaries are willing to lend at a lower
premium. Therefore, the response of the external finance premium upon impact is
negative. This immediate improvement in credit markets has a significant amplifica-
tion effect on investment so that the response of investment upon impact more than
doubles the initial response of net worth. The initial response of output is positive
but smaller than the boost in investment because consumption decreases upon im-
pact and the total resources constraint needs to be satisfied. The negative response
of consumption upon impact is linked to the general equilibrium effects of my model.
A nonfundamental increase in entrepreneurial wealth is financed through a reduction
in household wealth. The reduction in total disposable income is not large enough
to generate a decrease in consumption of the same magnitude as the increase in en-
trepreneurial wealth. This is due to the fact that other sources of household wealth,
such as labor income, react positively to the wealth shock, since hours worked in-
crease upon impact. The positive response of inflation and the nominal interest rate
suggests that the wealth shock displays the features of a standard demand shock:
quantities and prices move in the same direction, leading to a tightening of monetary
policy.
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The responses of labor share, inflation, and nominal interest rates for the 1954-
1969 and 1970-1983 periods are not as similar as the IRFs for the other variables. The
IRF of labor share undertakes very small values, the largest one being 0.008%. The
differences between the responses in the 1950s-1960s and the 1970s-early 1980s are
driven by small differences in the IRFs of output and hours worked across subsamples.
The larger response of inflation upon impact in 1970s-early 1980s is due to a less active
response to deviations of inflation from the target by the monetary authority. That is,
inflation is left to vary more ad libitum. I can explain the larger response upon impact
of interest rates in the 1970-1983 period by noting that the monetary authority also
responds to deviations of output growth from its steady-state value and that such a
response is tighter over this period than in the 1950s and 1960s.
In the Great Moderation era, the response of net worth to the same wealth shock
peaks at a higher value and a quarter later. From the second quarter onward, the
response function post-1984 always lies above those for the pre-1984 sample peri-
ods. This can be easily reconcilable from the definition of aggregate net worth.
Lower average agency costs alleviate the deadweight loss associated with bankruptcy,
µtG(ω¯t)R
k
tQt−1Kt, which implies that for the same initial increase in wealth, the
effects are more long-lasting, since more resources are accumulated from period to
period. Higher persistence induced by the lower dependence on the financial acceler-
ator mechanism translates into more persistent responses for all variables except labor
share. Therefore, the persistence implied by the financial accelerator is a negative
function of the size of financial rigidity. The responses for all variables except net
worth are also characterized by a significantly smaller response upon impact. This
is driven by the smaller size of the financial accelerator mechanism. Lower levels
of credit market imperfections reduce the elasticity of the external finance premium
with respect to the leverage ratio. Therefore, the amplification effect linked to the
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improvement in credit market conditions is more muted.
Shock to the marginal bankruptcy cost
Figure C-2 reports the impulse response functions to shocks to the marginal bankruptcy
cost. I focus on a negative shock that generates a reduction upon impact in the ex-
ternal financial premium of 0.06% in the pre-1984 sample period. Such a shock also
generates a response upon impact of similar magnitude to the one generated by the
wealth shock in the post-1984 sample period. I define the innovation under analysis
so as to make the comparison with the impulse response functions to a wealth shock
reported in the previous section easier.
As in the previous section, I first discuss the IRFs for the pre-1984 period. A
negative shock to agency costs creates an incentive for entrepreneurs to select con-
tractual terms with a larger debt-to-net worth ratio, since the deadweight loss linked
to bankruptcy is smaller. There are two opposing effects operating as a result of
higher debt-to-net worth ratios. On the one hand, both the default probability and
the default productivity threshold increase, offsetting the effect of lower bankruptcy
costs in determining entrepreneurial net worth. I label this effect the default effect.
On the other hand, there is a mass effect that stays for the increase in capital invest-
ment linked to a larger set of resources available. Larger amounts of capital holdings
imply a larger equity value through an increase in total capital returns. Given that
the response upon impact of entrepreneurial net worth is negative, the default effect
dominates the mass effect. After a few quarters, however, the mass effect becomes
the dominant one, since the response of the debt-to-net worth ratio is decreasing
given that the IRF for the external finance premium is increasing. The response of
net worth is increasing until quarter 38 and very persistent. Figure C-3 reports the
IRFs for the 1954-1969 sample period considering 200 quarters. I observe that net
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worth, consumption, and output need more than 150 quarters, i.e., 38 years, to get
back to their steady-state values. I can conclude that the effects of a shock to the
marginal bankruptcy cost have an ”almost permanent” flavor. I use quotation marks
because given that the model economy is stationary, a transitory shock does not imply
a permanent effect per se, but it can have a very long-lasting one.
The response of investment upon impact is above 3.5%, which is larger than the
response I obtained to a wealth shock. This result is driven by the mass effect ex-
plained above. Irrespective of the relative dominance of this effect in terms of shaping
the response of entrepreneurial wealth, the increase in the pool of resources available
for purchasing capital enhances investment activity in the economy. In particular,
note that after a wealth shock, the debt-to-net worth ratio does not increase, which
explains the difference in the response of investment after the two financial shocks.
Consumption responds to the expansionary shock positively. Hours worked, how-
ever, decrease upon impact. The enlargement in investment raises future productivity
and, hence, future wages. Households perform intertemporal substitution by decreas-
ing current hours and increasing them in the future when wages are higher. As a
consequence of the reduction of hours upon impact, output responds negatively to
an expansionary shock to agency costs. However, as with net worth, after a few pe-
riods output’s response is positive, large, and long-lasting. The positive slope of the
response of output over the first 40 quarters or so is driven by the positive slope of
the responses of both consumption and hours worked.
Given the expansionary effect on investment of the shock at hand, inflation in-
creases upon impact. As before, the difference in the initial response in the 1950s-
1960s versus the 1970s-early 1980s is driven by monetary policy. In the latter sub-
period, inflation floats more significantly without meeting a strong enough response
from the monetary authority.
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The response of the nominal interest rate is negative pre-1984 and positive after-
wards. The federal funds rate, in my model, responds to both deviations of inflation
and output growth from their respective steady-state values. The initial negative
response of output in the pre-1984 subperiods translates into negative output growth
upon impact of the shocks. The monetary authority responds by decreasing the in-
terest rate. The positive response of inflation requires an increase in the federal funds
rate. However, the reduction in output growth dominates the increase in inflation,
forcing the monetary authority to use an expansionary monetary policy. However,
post-1984, the response of output upon impact is negligible. Therefore, the rise in
inflation, even though it is 50% smaller than in the 1970s and the early 1980s, dom-
inates monetary policy-making. The risk-free nominal interest rate, then, increases
upon impact.
Given the significant decline in the size of the financial accelerator, the post-1984
impulse response functions are all characterized by smaller responses for all variables.
Comparison of impulse response functions
In this section, I compare the impulse response functions to the two expansionary
financial shocks. Let us focus on the responses for the 1954-1969 sample period.
The same rationale follows for the other sample periods of interest. Both financial
shocks generate the sample response upon impact for the external finance premium.
The responses upon impact of net worth, output, consumption, and hours worked,
reported in Figure C-4, are very different. Therefore, I can learn about the source of
the responses.
While net worth responds positively upon impact to a wealth shock, its initial
response to a shock to the marginal bankruptcy cost is negative. In the latter, the
response upon impact is determined by the dominance of the default effect over the
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mass effect. After a wealth shock, the default probability decreases, the default pro-
ductivity threshold decreases, and the recovery rate remains unchanged. Therefore,
irrespective of the response of the debt-to-net worth ratio, the response of net worth
is always positive upon impact.
The response upon impact of consumption to an expansionary financial shock is
a function of the nature of the financial shock. A change in entrepreneurial wealth
driven by an equity valuation shifter, such as my wealth shock, modifies consump-
tion in the reverse direction, since exogenously driven variations in entrepreneurs’
net worth are financed by the household sector. However, consumption responds to
an expansionary financial shock as to any expansionary shock hitting the economy
whenever the financial shock affects the marginal bankruptcy cost.
Hours worked respond to a positive technology shock in a framework with sticky
prices when the financial shock decreases the marginal monitoring cost. The sign of
the response to a wealth shock is identical to the one implied by an expansionary
technology shock in a standard RBC model. Consequently, the signs of the responses
of output to expansionary wealth shocks are determined by those of the responses of
output.
4.3 What are the Effects of Financial Shocks on
Consumption? An Empirical Assessment
4.3.1 Data and statistical model
There is a lot of diversity in the literature on financial frictions about the financial
series used to perform estimation exercises. [42] and [28] use data from the Flow of
Funds accounts provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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[17] use several financial variables in their estimation exercise: as a measure of real
net worth for entrepreneurs, the value of the Dow Jones industrial average scaled by
the GDP deflator; bank reserves; external finance premium defined as the difference
between Baa and Aaa yields on corporate bonds; and the spread between the 10-year
government rate and the federal funds rate. [33] use a proxy for the external finance
premium based on a sample of credit spreads constructed from bond data provided
by Lehman/Warga and Merril Lynch. [5], however, set the risk spread at the steady
state considering the historical average of the difference between the prime loan rate
and the six-month T-bill.
In this paper, I estimate four-variate Bayesian vector autoregressive (VAR) models
including consumption growth, investment growth, business wealth growth, and a
proxy for the external finance premium. While consumption is defined as durable
consumption plus services provided by NIPA, investment is constructed using gross
private investment. Both variables are corrected by the size of the nonfarm business
sector in the economy. I consider two different measures of business wealth: (i) net
worth defined as tangible assets minus credit market liabilities using the Flow of
Funds Accounts provided by the Board of Governors and (ii) the real counterpart
of the Industrial Dow Jones index. I perform the analysis considering the two most
common proxies in the literature for the premium on external borrowing faced by
the business sector: the corporate bond spread and a measure of the prime lending
spread. The corporate bond spread is defined as the Baa rate over the Aaa rate. I
define the prime lending rate as the difference between the prime loan rate and the
3-month T-bill. In order to make my purely empirical analysis comparable with the
results obtained under the theoretical framework estimated in Chapter 3, I use data
from 1954:IV to 2006:IV.
Let me assume that the m×1 vector yt is described by the following reduced form
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representation of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model
yt = Φ1yt−1 + ...+ Φpyt−p + ut (4.1)
where ut are the one-step ahead forecast errors with variance-covariance matrix Σ
so that ut ∼iid N (0,Σ). I can add a constant and a time trend to the above repre-
sentation. I assume that the prediction errors, ut, are a function of m fundamental
innovations, vt, which are assumed to be mutually independent with unit variance,
Et [vtv′t] = Im. I need to find an identifying matrix, A, that defines a one-to-one
mapping from the vector of structural shocks, vt, to the reduced form residuals, ut.
Therefore, the matrix A is such that ut = Avt and Σ = E [utu′t] = AE [vtv′t]A′ = AA′.
Because of the orthogonality assumption for the structural innovations and the sym-
metry of Σ, I need to impose at least m(m−1)
2
restrictions on A in order to achieve
identification.
4.3.2 Sign restriction identification: Methodology
[59] proposes an agnostic identification procedure based on sign restrictions on the
impulse response functions implied by the VAR model. Before describing the identi-
fication strategy, let us obtain the representation for the impulse response function.
Let us rewrite the VAR defined in equation 4.1 in companion form
Yt = ΦYt−1 + ut (4.2)
The impulse responses to fundamental shocks are given by
∂Yt+j
∂vt
= ΦjA. I aim to
identify the columns of A associated to financial shocks. The matrix A is unique up
to an orthonormal transformation, that is, for any ΩΩ′ = Im I have Σ = AΩΩ′A.
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As [27] describe, there are two approaches to pin the matrix Ω down: Givens and
Householder transformations.
An orthonormal matrix Ω for anm−variate VAR can be obtained as the product of
m(m−1)
2
Givens matrices so that there are m(m−1)
4
combinations of rotations of different
elements. Rotations are always bivariate so in an m-dimensional system rows m and
n are rotated by
Ωm,n =

1 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 0 . . . 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 cosϕ . . . − sinϕ 0
. . . . . . . . . 1 . . . . . .
0 0 sinϕ . . . cosϕ 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 0 0 1

(4.3)
For expositional purpose, let us consider m = 3, then the orthonormality restric-
tions can be imposed using the following
Ω =

cosϕ1 sinϕ1 0
− sinϕ1 cosϕ1 0
0 0 1


cosϕ2 0 sinϕ2
0 1 0
− sinϕ2 0 cosϕ2


1 0 0
0 cosϕ3 sinϕ3
0 − sinϕ3 cosϕ3

(4.4)
with {ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3} ∈ [0, 2pi]. Note that the matrix Ω does not span the space of all
orthonormal matrices but only the subspace of orthonormal matrices with a unit
determinant.
Householder transformation are based on delivering an orthonormal matrix Ω
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by generating draws from a standard Gaussian distribution and computing the QR
decomposition. [59] shows that for an arbitrary decomposition A˜ of the matrix Σ, any
structural impulse vector a from the identifying matrix A can be represented as A˜α,
where α is a vector belonging to the hypersphere of unit radius in Rm2. The natural
candidates for the arbitrary decomposition A˜ of the identifying matrix A are the QR
decomposition (Householder transformation) and the Cholesky decomposition of the
matrix Σ.
I use a Bayesian approach to estimate the VAR model. Under this framework,
sign restrictions are equivalent to assign a zero probability to reduced-form param-
eters that deliver impulse response functions that do not satisfy the identification
restrictions. I use a Minnesota prior for the reduced-form VAR parameters and an
independent uniform prior on α. Therefore, given Gaussian errors in (4.1), I can con-
clude that the posterior distribution for Φ and Σ is of the Inverted Wishart-Normal
family. I obtain posterior draws from the posterior for the VAR coefficients and draws
from the space of possible impulse vectors. I make inference using the joint draws
that satisfy the identifying sign restrictions for the impulse response functions. The
posterior sampler can be described as follows:
1. Obtain draws for Φ,Σ using a Gibbs sampler. Take n1 draws. Compute A˜ =
chol(Σ).
2. For each draw,
(a) generate a draw for α from the m-dimensional unit sphere by drawing α˜
from an m-dimensional standard normal distribution and normalizing its
length to unity.
α =
α˜
‖α˜‖ (4.5)
2Essentially, α is a column of the Ω matrix.
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(b) construct the impulse vector a = A˜α.
(c) compute the impulse response functions.
(d) if the sign restrictions for the k = {0, 1, ..} horizons are satisfied, store the
impulse response functions. Otherwise, discard.
3. Repeat steps 2a-2d n2 times.
In my case, I perform the estimation exercise for all the variables but the proxy for
the external finance premium in growth rates. But, I impose the sign restrictions on
the variables in levels, that is, I impose the constraints on the accumulated impulse
response functions. Not only my theoretical model but also any economic model would
suggest that a shock reinforcing the value of firms has two effects. On the one hand, it
reduces the cost of borrowing since the value of the collateral is larger. On the other
hand, it enhances investment spending. Therefore, I can identify an expansionary
shock to business wealth by imposing a positive response during two quarters for net
worth and investment, and a negative response during two quarters for the credit
spread. The choice of the number of periods during which the sign restrictions are
imposed is not trivial. It would be of great interest to perform robustness checks using
different values for k. Note that I have left unspecified the response of consumption
since my object of interest is to assess empirically how consumption responds to a
shock to the value of firms. The sign restrictions used to identify the financial shock
under analysis are given in Table 36.
4.3.3 Results
In the appendix, I report the median and the 95% credible interval set for the points
on the impulse response functions satisfying the sign restrictions. I perform the
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analysis not only using the whole sample, but also dividing it up using the breakpoints
identified in Chapter 3. Table 37 delivers the percentage of responses satisfying the
identification restrictions that imply a negative response upon impact of consumption.
From the table, the main conclusion is that there is ambiguity about the sign of the
response of consumption to a financial shock affecting business wealth.
Let us first consider the data set in which net worth is measured using data
from the Flow of Funds accounts (FOFA) and the proxy for the external finance
premium is the corporate bond spread. In this case, 10% of the responses satisfying
the identification restrictions deliver a negative response upon impact of consumption
when considering the whole sample under analysis. By subsamples, I obtain that while
in 1970-1983 only 2% of the responses are negative upon impact, both in 1954-1969
and 1984-2006 more than 30% of the responses satisfying the sign restrictions generate
responses of opposite signs for consumption and investment. Figure C-5 reports the
impulse response functions for the whole sample and figure C-8 the ones for the
subperiod 1970-1983. I can highlight several differences when comparing those two
sets of impulse response functions: (i) the 95% bands for consumption in the 1970-
1983 subsample are in the positive real line, (ii) investment peaks at a higher value
and stabilizes at a larger value in the 1970-1983 subsample due to the fact that, as
both investment and consumption responses are positive, the enhancement of output
after a financial shock is larger which boosts investment even further, and (iii) while
it takes 10 quarters to cross the zero point for the corporate spread response for the
whole sample, it only takes 6 quarters in the 1970-1983 subperiod.
When net worth is measured using FOFA but the cost of external funding is
measured with the prime lending spread, I obtain that 57% of the responses satisfying
the restrictions deliver a negative response upon impact for consumption during the
1970-1983 sample. This result sharply differs from the 2% obtained when the external
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finance premium was measured using the corporate bond spread. Comparing the
impulse response function for consumption in figure C-9 with that using the corporate
bond spread (figure C-8), I observe that while in the former, the median response is
always negative; in the latter, the 95% credible bands are positive. Therefore, I can
conclude that assessing the effects of financial shocks on consumption is not a trivial
matter since it significantly depends upon the choice of observable variables in the
empirical analysis.
If I measure business wealth with the firm’s value in the stock market, that is,
with the real counterpart of the industrial Dow Jones index and the cost of external
borrowing using the corporate bond spread, I obtain that the percentages of responses
upon impact of opposite sign for consumption and investment across subsamples range
from 30 to 49%. Figure C-6 reports the impulse response functions for the whole
sample under this framework.
Finally, when I use the Dow Jones as proxy for business wealth and the prime
lending rate as proxy for the cost of borrowing, I obtain that 55% of the responses
satisfying the identification restrictions imply a negative response upon impact of con-
sumption when using the whole sample. In the 1970-1983 subperiod, that percentage
is equal to 65%. During 1954-1969, however, only 10% of the responses deliver a
response upon impact of consumption of the opposite sign to the response of invest-
ment. I deliver the impulse response functions for the whole sample in figure C-7. It
is remarkable that the median response for consumption is below zero for almost 5
quarters.
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4.4 Conclusion
I have analyzed the model implied dynamics in response to the financial shocks in-
troduced in the third chapter of this thesis. I conclude that financial factors are
relevant in shaping the business cycle properties of financial variables, investment,
and the nominal interest rate. Financial shocks are not only the only drivers of the
variance of net worth, but also the main drivers of investment variance in the Great
Moderation era. The relative contribution of technology shocks to the variance of
real variables decreases significantly over time. The estimated reduction in the size
of the financial accelerator changes the propagation mechanism of financial shocks to
the economy. The responses upon impact are smaller for both financial shocks and
the responses to a wealth shock are more persistent.
I obtain that the model implied response upon impact of consumption to an
expansionary financial shock affecting business wealth is negative. Although this
result is widespread in the literature on the financial accelerator, it seems to be at
odds with the popular understanding of an expansionary shock.
The best way of assessing the goodness of fit of my model in this dimension is by
comparing my results with the empirical responses. To the best of my knowledge,
there is no empirical characterization of the effects of a shock to business wealth on
household consumption in the literature. I do perform such an analysis in this chapter
using sign restrictions and several measures of business wealth and the external finance
premium.
I conclude that assessing the effects of financial shocks on consumption is not
a trivial issue since my results depend significantly upon the choice of observable
variables to proxy both firms’ value and the cost of borrowing. In any case, I can state
that the response of consumption to a financial shock of the nature I am interested in
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is ambiguous since I always obtain a non-zero percentage of responses of consumption
and investment of opposite signs.
It would be of great interest to address the empirical characterization of the re-
sponse of consumption to a shock to business wealth using the measures of the external
finance premium constructed by [33] using micro data.
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Appendices
Appendix A Chapter 2
Appendix A.1 Tables and figures
Table 1: Calibration Targets
1948:1-2006:4 1948:1-1983:4 1984:1-2006:4
H∗ 0.31 0.31 0.31
Y ∗ 1 1 1
(K/V
Y
)∗ 10.288 10.502 9.953
(X
K
)∗ 0.0277 0.0276 0.0279
( I
Y
)∗ 0.28 0.29 0.28
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Table 2: Deterministic Trend: Calibrated Parameters
1948:1-2006:4 1948:1-1983:4 1984:1-2006:4
α 0.36 0.36 0.36
γa 0.000131 0.001413 -0.000824
γv 0.006760 0.005311 0.009438
β 0.995 0.992 0.998
δ 0.0135 0.0131 0.0121
η 0.0034 0.0037 0.0030
µ 0.0086 0.0091 0.0074
ϕa 4.67 4.59 4.83
ϕv -0.16 -0.07 -0.65
ρa 0.98 0.97 0.96
ρv1 1.77 1.71 1.73
ρv2 -0.77 -0.76 -0.73
σξa 0.0073 0.0086 0.0045
σξv 0.0033 0.0037 0.0023
ν {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2} {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2} {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}
B {30.02, 9.31, 6.30, 5.18} {30.21, 9.36, 6.34, 5.21} {29.73, 9.22, 6.24, 5.13}
Table 3: Baseline Stochastic Trend: Calibrated Parameters
1948:1-2006:4 1948:1-1983:4 1984:1-2006:4
α 0.36 0.36 0.36
γa 0.000619 0.001489 -0.000734
γv 0.00643 0.00493 0.008762
β 0.9894 0.9897 0.9889
δ 0.01348 0.01401 0.01267
η 0.0034 0.0037 0.0030
µ 0.92443 0.91670 0.93694
σa 0.0074 0.0087 0.0045
σv 0.0054 0.0060 0.0030
ν {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2} {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2} {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}
B {30.02, 9.31, 6.30, 5.18} {30.21, 9.36, 6.34, 5.21} {29.73, 9.22, 6.24, 5.13}
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Table 4: Stochastic Trend with a Moving Average Component: Calibrated Parameters
1948:1-2006:4 1948:1-1983:4 1984:1-2006:4
α 0.36 0.36 0.36
γa 0.000619 0.001489 -0.000734
γv 0.006404 0.004911 0.008739
β 0.9894 0.9897 0.9889
δ 0.01352 0.01404 0.01271
η 0.0034 0.0037 0.0030
µ 0.92439 0.91667 0.93692
ρ 0.618159 0.6359218 0.5071769
σa 0.0074 0.0087 0.0045
σv 0.0025 0.0028 0.0012
ν {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2} {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2} {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}
B {30.02, 9.31, 6.30, 5.18} {30.21, 9.36, 6.34, 5.21} {29.73, 9.22, 6.24, 5.13}
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Table 22: Multivariate Analysis Results: ratio of standard deviations
σpost/σpre
Data Model
DTM
c 0.58 0.37
i 0.53 0.48
y 0.48 0.59
k 0.65 0.67
h 0.69 0.63
y/h 0.68 0.41
STM
c 0.58 0.53
i 0.53 0.54
y 0.48 0.52
k 0.65 0.52
h 0.69 0.54
y/h 0.68 0.51
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Figure A-1: Impulse response functions with respect to a neutral technology shock
IRF for 1SD in NEUTRAL innovation
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Figure A-2: Impulse response functions with respect to an investment-specific tech-
nology shock
IRF for 1SD in INVESTMENT SPECIFIC innovation
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Appendix A.3 Balance Growth Path
From the feasibility constraint I can conclude that output, consumption, and invest-
ment grow at the same rate
Yt = Ct + It
Yt
Yt−1
=
Ct
Ct−1
Ct−1
Yt−1
+
It
It−1
It−1
Yt−1
gY = gC
Ct−1
Yt−1
+ gI
It−1
Yt−1
Therefore, gY is constant if and only if gY = gC = gI . Let us consider the investment
equation
(1 + η)Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + VtIt
(1 + η)
Kt+1
Kt
= (1− δ) + VtIt
Kt
(1 + η)gK = (1− δ) + VtIt
Kt
gK is constant if and only if (V × I) grows at the same rate as K which requires that
gK = gIgV .
Let us analyze the production function
Yt = AtK
α
t H
1−α
t
gY = gAg
α
Kg
1−α
H
Given that hours are stationary, that is, gH = 1, I have that gY = gAg
α
K , where
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gK = gY gV . Therefore,
gY = g
1
1−α
A g
α
1−α
V
In the deterministic trend model, gY = e
1
1−αγa+
α
1−αγv and gV = e
γv , which implies
that gK = e
1
1−α (γa+γv). In the stochastic trend model, gY = A
1
1−α
t V
α
1−α
t and gK =
A
1
1−α
t V
1
1−α
t .
Appendix A.4 Log-linearization around the steady state
Let us define xˆt = ln(X˜t/X
∗), then the log-linearized system of equations for the
deterministic trend model is given by:
yˆt =
C∗
Y ∗
cˆt +
I∗
Y ∗
iˆt
yˆt = αkˆt + (1− α)hˆt + εat
qvkˆt+1 = (1− δ)kˆt + V0 I
∗
K∗
[eεvt(1 + iˆt)− 1]
0 = Et
[
cˆt − cˆt−1 + εvt − εvt+1 +
(
R∗
1− δ +R∗
)
rˆt+1
]
hˆt = ν(wˆt − cˆt)
rˆt = yˆt − kˆt + εvt
wˆt = yˆt − hˆt
The log-linearized system of equation for the stochastic trend model is given by:
yˆt = cˆt
C∗
Y ∗
+ iˆt
I∗
Y ∗
yˆt = −α(qˆt + vˆt) + αkˆt + (1− α)hˆt
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kˆt+1 = (1− δ)
(
1
q∗v∗
)[
kˆt − (qˆt + vˆt)
]
+ iˆt
I∗
K∗
0 = Et
[
cˆt − cˆt−1 − (qˆt+1 + vˆt+1) + rˆkt+1]
]
rˆkt =
(
R∗
Rk∗
)
rˆt
hˆt = ν(wˆt − cˆt)
rˆt = yˆt − kˆt + qˆt + vˆt
wˆt = yˆt − hˆt
qˆt =
1
1− αεat +
α
1− αεvt
vˆt = εvt
The above is a system of 11 equations and 11 unknowns: {cˆt, iˆt, yˆt, kˆt, hˆt, bˆt, rˆt, rˆkt , qˆt, vˆt, }.
To proceed with estimation I need to also consider the following conditions:
q∗ = e
1
1−αγa+
α
1−αγv
v∗ = eγv
R∗ =
q∗v∗
β
− (1− δ)
Rk∗ = (1− δ) +R∗ = q
∗v∗
β
I∗
K∗
= 1− (1− δ) 1
q∗v∗
K∗
Y ∗
=
1
αq∗v∗
R∗
C∗
Y ∗
=
(
1− δ
q∗v∗
− 1
)
K∗
Y ∗
+ 1
I∗
Y ∗
= 1− C
∗
Y ∗
H∗ =
(
1
B∗
) ν
1+ν
[
(1− α)Y
∗
C∗
] ν
1+ν
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Appendix A.5 Stochastic trend model: closed form solution
In the economy under analysis both welfare theorems hold, therefore I can solve the
planner’s problem which is given by
maxCt,HtU = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
lnCt −B H
1+1/ν
t
1 + 1/ν
)]
s.t.
Ct + It = AtK
α
t H
1−α
t
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + VtIt
At = At−1eγa+at
Vt = Vt−1eγv+vt
A0, V0, K0 given
I will proceed first by combining the resource constraint and the law of motion for
capital. Thus, my equilibrium conditions are given by the Euler equation, the labor
supply, and the new resources constraint. Secondly, as my economy is non-stationary
I need to transform it to be able to solve my model. All variables but hours and
capital grow at rate Qt = A
1
1−α
t V
α
1−α
t . Capital grows at rate QtVt = A
1
1−α
t V
1
1−α
t and
hours are stationary. Therefore, the equilibrium conditions for the transformed model
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economy are given by3:
1 = βEt
 C˜t
C˜t+1
(1− δ)e− 11−α (γa+γv+at+1+vt+1)
+ αe−
α
1−α (γa+γv+at+1+vt+1)K˜α−1t+1 H
1−α
t+1

BH
1/ν
t = (1− α)
Y˜t/Ht
C˜t
C˜t + K˜t+1 = (1− δ)e− 11−α (γa+γv+at+vt)K˜t + e− α1−α (γa+γv+at+vt)K˜αt H1−αt
Let us assume there is full depreciation (i.e. δ = 1). Thus, the above reduces to:
1 = βEt
[
C˜t
C˜t+1
(
αe−
α
1−α (γa+γv+at+1+vt+1)K˜α−1t+1 H
1−α
t+1
)]
(6)
BH
1/ν
t = (1− α)
Y˜t/Ht
C˜t
(7)
C˜t + K˜t+1 = e
− α
1−α (γa+γv+at+vt)K˜αt H
1−α
t (8)
Appendix A.5.1 Baseline system: An exact solution
My guess for policy function for capital will be
K˜t+1 = αβe
− α
1−α (γa+γv+at+vt)K˜αt H
1−α
t (9)
3Maybe it is more intuitive to write the Euler equation as
1 = βEt
[
e−
1
1−α (γa+at+1+α(γv+vt+1))
C˜t
C˜t+1
(
(1− δ)e−γv−vt+1 + αeγa+at+1K˜α−1t+1 H1−αt+1
)]
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Then, from (8) I have that the policy function for consumption is given by:
C˜t = e
− α
1−α (γa+γv+at+vt)K˜αt H
1−α
t (1− αβ) (10)
Let us plug (9) and (10) in (6)
1 = βEt
[
e−
α
1−α (at+vt−at+1−vt+1) K˜
α
t H
1−α
t
K˜αt+1H
1−α
t+1
αe−
α
1−α (γa+γv+at+1+vt+1)K˜α−1t+1 H
1−α
t+1
]
= αβEt
[
1
K˜t+1
e−
α
1−α (γa+γv+at+vt)K˜αt H
1−α
t
]
which implies
K˜t+1 = αβe
− α
1−α (γa+γv+at+vt)K˜αt H
1−α
t
since K˜t+1 is a choice variable at time t not an unknown variable dated at time
t + 1. Therefore, as my guess satisfies the equilibrium conditions, I can ensure the
policy function for capital is of the form given by (9). Consequently, the guess for
the consumption policy rule is also part of the solution to my model. Note that I
constructed such a guess by using (9) and the resources constraint. Note that both
policy rules depend on model parameters, current realizations of shocks (I assume
current shocks are observed before current decisions are taken), capital at time t
which is a predetermined variable (chosen at time t− 1), and current labor decision.
Therefore, to completely characterize the policy rules of interest it remains to provide
the labor supply policy function. To do so let us consider (7) and plug (10) so that:
BH
1/ν
t =
W˜t
C˜t
=
(1− α)Y˜t/Ht
(1− αβ)Y˜t
123
Thus,
Ht =
(
1− α
B(1− αβ)
) ν
1−ν
(11)
which is a constant.
Therefore, by substituting (11) in (9) and (10) I have my policy rules as functions
of model parameters and current state variables.
Appendix A.5.2 Log-linearized system: An approximate solution
Let us consider the following log-linearized system (under the assumption of full
depreciation).
yˆt =
C∗
Y ∗
cˆt +
I∗
Y ∗
iˆt (12)
yˆ = − α
1− α(at + vt) + αkˆt + (1− α)hˆt (13)
kˆt+1 =
I∗
K∗
iˆt =
I∗/Y ∗
K∗/Y ∗
iˆt (14)
0 = E
[
cˆt − cˆt+1 − 1
1− α(at+1 + vt+1) + rt+1
]
(15)
hˆt = ν(wˆt − cˆt) (16)
rˆt = yˆt − kˆt + 1
1− α(at + vt) (17)
wˆt = yˆt − hˆt (18)
Plugging (14) into (12) I obtain
yˆt =
C∗
Y ∗
cˆt +
K∗
Y ∗
kˆt+1 (19)
Substitute (17) in (15)
0 = E
[
cˆt − cˆt+1yˆt+1 − kˆt+1
]
(20)
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My guesses for policy rules are given by:
kˆt+1 = − α
1− α(at + vt) + αkˆt + (1− α)hˆt (21)
cˆt =
1
C∗/Y ∗
(
1− K
∗
Y ∗
)
kˆt+1 (22)
Plugging (21) and (22) into (15)
0 = E
 1
C∗/Y ∗
(
1− K
∗
Y ∗
)− α
1− α(at + vt − at+1 − vt+1) + α(kˆt − kˆt+1)
+ (1− α)(hˆt − hˆt+1)
− α
1− α(at+1 + vt+1) + αkˆt+1 + (1− α)hˆt+1+
α
1− α(at + vt − αkˆt − (1− α)hˆt)

0 = E
[(
1− K
∗
Y ∗
)
yˆt − C
∗
Y ∗
yˆt −
(
1− K
∗
Y ∗
)
yˆt+1 +
C∗
Y ∗
yˆt+1
]
where (
1− K
∗
Y ∗
)
yˆt − C
∗
Y ∗
yˆt −
(
1− K
∗
Y ∗
)
yˆt+1 +
C∗
Y ∗
yˆt+1 = 0 (23)
since
1 =
C∗
Y ∗
+
K∗
Y ∗
(24)
Therefore, I can conclude that the policy functions for capital and consumption are
given by (21) and (22) respectively. I need to provide also a policy rule for hours.
Intuitively, the policy rule should be equal to zero. Remember that in the exact
solution hours were constant over time. Therefore, the deviation from steady state
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should be zero. I show below that given (22), hˆt = 0 for all t.
hˆt = νwˆt − νcˆt = ν(yˆt − hˆt)− νcˆt
hˆt =
ν
1− ν (yˆt − cˆt)
=
1
C∗/Y ∗
[
C∗
Y ∗
+
K∗
Y ∗
− 1
]
kˆt+1
= 0
Appendix A.6 Extensions
Appendix A.6.1 Hansen-Rogerson Preferences
So far my analysis have only considered the intensive margin of the labor input. Here
I will assume another specification for household’s preferences so that I will analyze
the extensive margin of the labor input. To do so let us assume the following:
1. Labor is indivisible.
2. Agents can trade employment lotteries.
3. Households have a constant relative risk-aversion utility function with a coeffi-
cient of risk-aversion equal to 1.
Therefore, (2.2) will be substituted by
U(Ct, Ht) = lnCt −BHt (25)
which implies that the short-run Frisch elasticity of labor supply is infinite.
It is obvious that the (detrended) equilibrium conditions under all the statistical
models are identical but the one associated with the labor supply. In particular,
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(2.11) and (2.25) will be substituted by
W˜t
C˜t
= B (26)
I need to recalibrate only the parameter linked to the weight of hours in the utility
function i.e. B. In fact, I have that
B = (1− α)Y
∗
C∗
1
H∗
(27)
I simulate my model only for the deterministic trend case and the baseline stochas-
tic trend one. I perform my analysis only for the whole sample.
First, I allow for the presence of both technology shocks. Then, I perform two
counterfactuals in order to asses the relative importance of each technology shock in
accounting for the business cycles features observed in the US data. On the one hand,
I shut down the investment specific shock and investigate the volatilities implied by
my model. On the other hand, I shut down the neutral shock and perform the same
analysis.
From table 19 I conclude that the volatilities of all the variables at hand are
larger than in the divisible labor economy. Moreover, the Hansen-Rogerson economy
overstates the volatilities of investment, output, capital, and hours when both shocks
are at hand. It is remarkable that, as in [39], the volatility of hours is larger than the
volatility of labor productivity.
The model performs better, in terms of accounting for volatilities, when there is
only an investment-specific shock than when there is only a neutral one. In fact,
a model with Hansen-Rogerson preferences and only an I-shock is able to replicate
almost perfectly the standard deviation of hours.
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From table 19, I conclude that a stochastic trend model is not able to generate
enough volatility in this scenario either. Under this specification, the neutral shock
is the one able to account for the bulk of the volatility for all the variables at hand.
Appendix A.6.2 Multivariate analysis
I have performed univariate analysis of the error structure associated to the different
specifications for the technology processes.I am interested here in exploring a multi-
variate error structure in order to analyze the interaction between both innovations.
Deterministic Trend Model
I will consider the following specification
lnAt = ϕa + γat+ εat (28)
lnVt = ϕv + γvt+ εvt (29)
and I assume  εat
εvt
 = Γ1
 εat−1
εvt−1
+ Γ2
 εat−2
εvt−2
+
 ξat
ξvt
 (30)
where  ξat
ξvt
 ∼ N (0,Σξ) (31)
I will restrict my attention to the performance of the model under a unit Frisch
elasticity. My estimates are reported in the following table. All the vector autore-
gressive processes estimated satisfy the stability condition i.e. there is no root that
lies outside the unit circle.
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The results obtained from the stochastic simulation of my model economy are
summarized in the table 21. Let us compare these results with those in table 7. The
direction of change for the volatilities of the different variables of interest is not uni-
lateral. For example, while the volatility of consumption is larger in the multivariate
setting, the volatility of capital is lower. The performance of the deterministic trend
model, however, improves in accounting for the volatility slowdown of investment,
capital, and hours.
Stochastic Trend Model
Let us consider the following
lnAt = lnAt−1 + γat+ εat (32)
lnVt = lnVt−1 + γvt+ εvt (33)
and I assume  εat
εvt
 = Γ1
 εat−1
εvt−1
+
 ξat
ξvt
 (34)
where  ξat
ξvt
 ∼ N (0,Σξ) (35)
The results from the estimation of the above specification are reported in table
20. The moments implied by this specification are in table 21. Comparing these
results with those reported in table 7 I conclude that the multivariate specification
implies even lower volatilities for all the variables at hand for all the periods. The
performance in terms of replicating the magnitude of the Great Moderation, however,
does not change significantly.
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From this analysis, I conclude that there is no a significative gain from using a
multivariate specification for the innovations.
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Appendix B Chapter 3
Appendix B.1 Tables
Table 23: Chow’s Breakpoint Test: AR(1) with drift
1970 1984 1970-1984
F LR F LR F LR
∆ Net worth 6.51** 6.47** 10.18*** 10.03*** 5.52*** 10.90***
∆ Output 3.29* 3.30* 24.20*** 23.11*** 12.69*** 24.28***
∆Investment 2.87* 2.87* 15.32*** 14.92*** 7.80*** 15.25***
∆Consumption 1.47 1.48 10.75*** 10.58*** 5.65*** 11.16***
Hours 0.11 0.11 7.59*** 7.53*** 4.94*** 9.80***
Labor share 0.60 0.61 0.18 0.18 0.30 0.61
Inflation 2.92* 2.93* 10.99*** 10.81*** 16.66*** 31.33***
Federal Funds Rate 3.54* 3.55* 6.24*** 6.21*** 12.10*** 23.21***
Notes: F refers to the F-statistic, which is distributed as F (k, T − 2k) where k is the number of
parameters to be tested and T the total number of observations. The critical values are 2.73 at 10%
significance level, 3.89 at 5%, and 6.76 at 1% when I test for one break. For two breaks, the critical
values are 2.33 at 10%, 3.04 at 5%, and 4.71 at 1%. LR refers to the log-likelihood ratio statistic,
which is distributed as χ2 with (m− 1)k degrees of freedom, where m is the number of subsamples.
The critical values when there is only one break are 2.71 at 10% significance level, 3.84 at 5%, and
6.64 at 1%. For two breaks, the critical values are 4.61 at 10%, 5.99 at 5%, and 9.21 at 1%. If the
statistic is above the critical value, the null hypothesis of no structural change can be rejected. The
symbol * indicates I can reject the null of parameter constancy at 10%, **, at 5%, and ***, at 1%.
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Table 24: Chow’s Breakpoint Test: Cyclical component. AR(1) with drift
1970 1984 1970-1984
F LR F LR F LR
Net worth 4.01** 4.01** 6.03** 6.00** 3.29** 6.58*
Output 2.66 2.67 20.45*** 19.69*** 10.79*** 20.82***
Investment 1.92 1.93 13.54*** 13.24*** 7.08*** 13.89***
Consumption 0.86 0.86 14.50*** 14.14*** 8.36*** 16.31***
Hours 0.54 0.54 11.23*** 11.04*** 6.62*** 13.02***
Labor share 0.82 0.83 0.06 0.06 0.46 0.94
Inflation 3.68* 3.69* 11.50*** 11.30*** 18.77*** 34.98***
Federal Funds Rate 3.88** 3.88** 7.47*** 7.41*** 14.17*** 29.93***
Table 25: Ratio post- to pre- standard deviation: Cyclical component
1984−2006
1954−1983
1970−1983
1954−1969
1984−2006
1970−1983
Output 0.49 1.55 0.41
Investment 0.60 1.47 0.51
Consumption 0.54 1.74 0.44
Hours 0.74 1.47 0.63
Labor share 0.88 1.23 0.80
Inflation 0.46 2.58 0.34
Federal funds rate 0.65 2.81 0.47
Net worth business 1.67 1.32 1.47
Debt business 1.41 1.71 1.13
Net worth households 1.23 1.94 1.04
Net private savings 1.55 1.16 1.44
Demand deposits 1.57 3.09 1.14
Notes: The cyclical component is extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the
quarterly frequency (λ = 1600).
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Table 27: Marginal Data Densities Comparison
Model MDD(model)-MDD(no breaks)
Breaks in 1970 and 1984
Only µ? -4
Only ψi 37
Only σj 34
µ?, ψi, σj 52
Notes: The marginal data density or marginal likelihood of the data is defined as
the expectation taken over the likelihood with respect to the prior distribution of the
parameters: p (Y |Mi) =
∫
p (Y |%,Mi) p (%|Mi) d%. MDD above refers to the natural
log of the marginal data density.
Table 28: Posterior estimates
Name Name
Median 95%C.I. Median 95%C.I.
α 0.28 [0.27, 0.30] ρr 0.44 [0.26, 0.58]
λ? 0.25 [0.22, 0.28] ρζ 0.94 [0.92, 0.97]
h 0.34 [0.27, 0.41] ρµ 0.97 [0.95, 0.98]
ν 1.03 [0.49, 1.79] ρλ 0.88 [0.84, 0.92]
a′′ 0.82 [0.31, 1.55] ρθ 0.98 [0.97, 0.99]
pi? 2.72 [2.34, 3.12] ρb 0.90 [0.87, 0.93]
ln(H?) 0.03 [0.01, 0.05] ρx 0.52 [0.44, 0.60]
ξp 0.40 [0.33, 0.46] 100Υz 0.54 [0.42, 0.66]
ξ 4.55 [2.59, 7.01]
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Table 29: Posterior estimates
Name Pre 1970 1970-1983 Post 1984
Median 95%C.I. Median 95%C.I. Mean 95%C.I.
µ? 0.24 [0.19, 0.28] 0.24 [0.19, 0.30] 0.05 [0.03,0.06]
σµ 1.67 [1.23, 2.18] 1.62 [1.19, 2.14] 7.18 [4.77, 10.7]
100σZ 1.52 [1.27, 1.82] 1.56 [1.29, 1.88] 0.82 [0.71, 0.95]
100σx 0.75 [0.63, 0.89] 0.91 [0.75, 1.08] 1.52 [1.30, 1.79]
100σζ 1.11 [0.75, 1.69] 1.64 [1.15, 2.32] 0.90 [0.72, 1.11]
100σb 1.70 [1.32, 2.19] 2.38 [1.77, 3.10] 1.25 [0.98, 1.57]
100σR 0.52 [0.39, 0.70] 0.85 [0.62, 1.14] 0.47 [0.35, 0.63]
100σθ 1.48 [1.06, 2.11] 1.82 [1.28, 2.65] 1.37 [1.06, 1.81]
100σλ 3.58 [2.86, 4.42] 4.66 [3.71, 5.79] 3.77 [3.18, 4.47]
ψpi 2.65 [2.24, 3.06] 1.84 [1.58, 2.14] 2.43 [2.03, 2.90]
ψy 0.31 [0.18, 0.45] 0.48 [0.32, 0.64] 0.47 [0.32, 0.63]
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Appendix B.2 Figures
Figure B-1: Debt to net worth ratio. Cyclical component.
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Appendix B.3 Data
I use US data from NIPA-BEA,CPS-BLS, the FRED database, and the Flow of Funds
Accounts from the Federal Reserve Board for the period 1954.4-2006.4.
Appendix B.3.1 Data used in estimation
• Growth rate of real per capita gross value added by the nonfarm business sector.
Data on nominal gross value added are available in NIPA Table 1.3.5. I have de-
flated such a series using the the implicit price index from table 1.3.4. I divide
the new series by the Civilian Noninstitutional +16 (BLS ID LNU00000000)
series to obtain per capita variables. The data provided by the BEA are annu-
alized so I divide by 4 to obtain quarterly values for the measures of interest.
• Growth rate of real per capita investment. Investment is defined as gross private
domestic investment from NIPA Table 1.1.5. I deflate the nominal variables
using the GDP deflator provided by NIPA Table 1.1.4. I weight the resulting
series using the relative significance of the nonfarm business sector in total GDP.
Finally, I do the same correction described above to render the investment series
in per capita quarterly terms.
• Growth rate of real per capita consumption. Consumption is defined as the sum
of personal consumption expenditures of nondurables and services from NIPA
Table 1.1.5. I deflate the nominal variables using the GDP deflator provided by
NIPA Table 1.1.4. I weight the resulting series using the relative significance
of the non-farm business sector in total GDP. Finally, I do the same correction
described above to have the series in per capita quarterly terms.
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• Growth rate of net worth. I define net worth as the real per capita weighted av-
erage of net worth for the corporate and noncorporate nonfarm business sector.
To ensure the measure of net worth from the data is close enough to the series
the model can actually account for, I define net worth as tangible assets minus
credit market instruments at market value. On the one hand, I use tangible
assets only as a measure for assets because, in my model, collateral is related
only to physical capital and inventories; that is, there is no role for financial
capital. On the other hand, I evaluate net worth at current (market) prices,
since such a variable in my theoretical framework stands for the value of the
collateral perceived by lenders. Credit market liabilities from the Flow of Funds
Accounts (the weighted sum of series FL104104005.Q from Table B.102 and se-
ries FL114102005.Q from Table B.103) stand for entrepreneurial debt. Tangible
assets are given by the weighted sum of series FL102010005.Q from Table B.102
and series FL112010005.Q from Table B.103.
• Hours worked is defined, following [56], as the log level of the BLS series
PRS85006023 divided by 100 and multiplied by the ratio of civilian popula-
tion over 16 (CE16OV) to a population index. The population index is equal to
the ratio of population at the corresponding quarter divided by the population
in the third quarter of 1992. This transformation is necessary, since the series
on hours is an index with 1992=100.
• Labor share is defined as the ratio of total compensation of employees (NIPA
Table 2.1) corrected by the size of the non-farm business sector to the gross
value added by the nonfarm business sector.
• Inflation is defined as the log difference of the price index for gross value added
by the nonfarm business sector (NIPA Table 1.3.4).
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• The Federal funds rate is taken from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).
Appendix B.3.2 Data used in the empirical evidence section
In addition to the series described above, I also consider the following ones
• Net private savings : Data on nominal net private savings are available in the
NIPA Table 5.1. I have deflated such a series using the implicit price index from
Table 1.3.4. I divide the new series by the Civilian Noninstitutional +16 (BLS
ID LNU00000000) series to obtain per capita variables. The data provided by
the BEA are annualized, so I divide by 4 to obtain quarterly values for the
measures of interest. I weight the resulting series using the relative significance
of the nonfarm business sector in total GDP.
• Debt in the nonfarm business sector : I define debt as the real per capita
weighted average of credit market liabilities for the corporate and noncorpo-
rate nonfarm business sector. Debt is defined as the weighted sum of series
FL104104005.Q from Table B.102 and series FL114102005.Q from Table B.103.
• Net worth of households (and nonprofit organizations): It is given by the real
per capita transformation of the series FL152090005 from Table B.100 from the
Flow of Funds Accounts.
• Demand deposits : It stands for real per capita demand deposits at commercial
banks provided by the series DEMDEPSL in the FRED database. Data are
available from 1959.
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Appendix B.4 Methodology
Appendix B.4.1 MCMC Algorithm
1. Posterior Maximization: The aim of this step is to obtain the parameter
vector to initialize my posterior simulator. To obtain the posterior mode, %˜, I
iterate over the following steps:
(a) Fix a vector of structural parameters %′.
(b) Solve the DSGE model conditional on %′ and compute the system matrices.
I restrict myself to the determinacy region of the parameter space.
(c) Use the Kalman filter to compute the likelihood of the parameter vector
%′, p(Y T |%′).
(d) Combine the likelihood function with the prior distribution.
2. Compute the numerical Hessian at the posterior mode. Let Σ˜ be the inverse
of such a numerical hessian.
3. Draw the initial parameter vector, %(0), from N (%˜(0), c20Σ˜) where c0 is a scal-
ing parameter. Otherwise, directly specify a starting value for the posterior
simulator.
4. Posterior Simulator: for s = 1, ..., nsim, draw ϑ from the proposal distribu-
tion N
(
%(s−1), c2Σ˜
)
, where c is a scaling parameter4. The jump from %(s−1) is
accepted with probability
min{1, r (%(s−1),ϑ|Y )}
4The scale factor is set to obtain efficient algorithms. [31] argue that the scale coefficient should
be set c ≈ 2.4√d, where d is the number of parameters to be estimated. However, I will fine tune
the scale factor to obtain a rejection rate of about 25%
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and rejected otherwise. Note that
r
(
%(s−1),ϑ|Y
)
=
L(ϑ|Y )p(ϑ)
L(%(s−1)|Y )p(%(s−1)) (36)
5. Approximate the expected value of a function h(%) by
1
nsim
nsim∑
s=1
h(%(s))
Appendix B.4.2 Kalman Filter
Let us cast the log-linearized dynamic system in state-space form:
• Transition equation:
st = (I − T ) ln(s¯) + Tst−1 +Rt
= J + Tst−1 +Rt
where T = Φ(%), R = Φε,  ∼ (0, Q), st stand for the vector of DSGE state
variables in log levels, and ln(s¯) is the vector of steady-state log-values of these
state variables. Let s = rows(st).
• Measurement equation:
yt = Zst
where Z = B(%) and I have imposed the assumption of zero measurement error
in the system.
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Linearity and Gaussian errors allow us to use the Kalman filter to evaluate the
likelihood function. I give an overview here of such a filter; for a complete description,
please see Chapter 13 in [37].
1. Initialization: The filter is initialized with the unconditional distribution of
the state vector.
• Initial mean:
sˆ0|0 = ln(s¯)
• Initial variance: P0|0 is given by the solution to the following discrete
Lyapunov equation
P0|0 = TP0|0T ′ +RQR′
2. Forecasting step
ŝt|t−1 = J + T ŝt−1|t−1
Pt|t−1 = TPt−1|t−1T ′ +RQR′
ŷt|t−1 = Zŝt|t−1
Ft|t−1 = ZPt|t−1Z ′
3. Evaluation of the log-likelihood
4. Updating step
ŝt|t = ŝt|t−1 + Pt|t−1Z ′F−1t|t−1(y
obs
t − ŷt|t−1)
Pt|t = Pt−1|t−1 − Pt−1|t−1Z ′F−1t|t−1Z ′Pt−1|t−1
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So far, I have assumed that the system matrices were all constant. The Kalman
filter, however, is also suitable for state-space models in which those matrices vary
over time. The filter needs simply to be modified so that the appropriate matrix is
used at each t. Given that the state-space system under analysis is a reduced-form
representation of a structural model, I should be careful when extending the filter to
allow for breaks in the system matrices. Note that if I allow for structural breaks in the
size of the shocks and/or the monetary policy coefficients, the system matrices vary
but there is no effect on the definition of the steady state of the economy. However,
if there is a break in a parameter defining the steady state of my model economy,
the econometrician needs to make sure she is using the same information set as the
economic agents.
Let us assume there is a shift in the steady state of the economy so that I go from
s¯1 to s¯2. This implies a shift in the entries of T and, hence, J . I need to introduce
the following modification in the forecasting step
• If t < t?,
ŝt|t−1 = J1 + T1ŝt−1|t−1
Pt|t−1 = T1Pt−1|t−1T ′1 +RQ1R
′
• If t = t?,
ŝt|t−1 = J2 + T2 (ln(s¯2)− ln(s¯1)) + T2ŝt−1|t−1
Pt|t−1 = T2Pt−1|t−1T ′2 +RQ2R
′
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• If t > t?,
ŝt|t−1 = J2 + T2ŝt−1|t−1
Pt|t−1 = T2Pt−1|t−1T ′2 +RQ2R
′
Appendix B.4.3 Variance decomposition
My data set contains the following series
{∆Y,∆I,∆C,∆N, log(H), log(LS), log
(
1 +
pi
400
)
, log
(
1 +
Rn
400
)
}
I am interested, however, in the second moments and dynamic properties of
log(Y ), log(I), log(C), log(N), log(H), log(LS), log
(
1 +
pi
400
)
, log
(
1 +
Rn
400
)
}
Therefore, I use an inverse difference filter for the first four components on the
spectrum implied by the DSGE model. The spectral density is obtained using the
state-space representation of the DSGE model and 500 bins for frequencies in the
range of periodicities of interest. In particular, I compute the variance decomposition
at business cycle frequencies, that is, I focus on those periodic components with cycles
between 6 and 32 quarters.
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Inverse difference filter
Let Xt be univariate data in log-levels and Yt = (1− L)Xt. Note that
Xt = (1− L)−1 Yt
=
∞∑
h=0
LhYt−h
=
∞∑
h=0
exp(−iωjh)Yt−h
Then, the spectral density of Xt is given by
sX (ω) =
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
h=0
exp (−iωjh)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
sY (ω)
which can be approximated by
sX (ω) =
∣∣∣∣ 11− exp (−iωjh)
∣∣∣∣2 sY (ω)
at any frequency by 0.
Appendix B.5 Log-linearized equilibrium conditions
Let Y˜t =
Yt
Za,t
for C, I,K,G,W/P,Mt+1/Pt, NBt+1/Pt, Dt+1, div, T,Nt+1. Let ς̂ =
log
(
ς
ς?
)
where ς? is the steady state value of the variable ς.
1. Trend variable
Ẑt = εa,t
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2. Household’s FOC with respect to NBt+1
̂˜
Λt = R̂
n
t + Et
[̂˜
Λt+1 − pit+1 + Ẑt+1
]
where Λt is the Lagrange multiplier linked to the budget constraint.
3. Household’s FOC with respect to Ht
b̂t + θ̂ +
1
ν
Ht =
̂˜
W t +
̂˜
Λt
4. Household’s FOC with respect to Dt+1
̂˜
Λt = R̂t + Et
[̂˜
Λt+1 − Ẑt+1
]
5. Household’s FOC with respect to Ct
̂˜
Λt =
Z? − βhρb
Z? − βh b̂t −
Z?h
(Z? − h) (Z? − βh) Ẑt −
(Z?)2 + βh2
(Z? − h) (Z? − βh)
̂˜
Ct
+
Z?h
(Z? − h) (Z? − βh)
̂˜
Ct−1 +
βZ?h
(Z? − h) (Z? − βh)Et
̂˜
Ct+1
6. Price of capital (from capital producers)
Q̂t = ξ
I˜?Z?
K˜?
(̂˜
I t + Ẑt − ̂˜Kt)− ζ̂t
7. Capital accumulation
̂˜
Kt+1 =
1− δ
Z?
( ̂˜
Kt − Ẑt
)
+
I˜?
K˜?
(
ζ̂t +
̂˜
I t
)
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8. New Keynesian Phillips curve
pi = κχ̂t + βEtpit+1 + κ
λ
1 + λ
λ̂t
where κ = (1−ξp)(1−ξpβ)
ξp
and χt is the real marginal cost.
9. Government constraint ̂˜
Gt =
̂˜
Y t
10. Taylor rule
R̂nt = ρRR̂
n
t−1 + (1− ρR)ρpipit + (1− ρR)ρY
(̂˜
Y t − ̂˜Y t−1 + Ẑt)+ εR,t
11. Definition of effective capital
̂˜
kt = ût +
̂˜
Kt − Ẑt
12. Optimal capital utilization
r̂kt =
(a′′)?
(rk)?
ût
13. Production technology
̂˜
Y t = α
̂˜
kt + (1− α)Ĥt
14. Optimal capital-to-labor ratio for intermediate goods producers
̂˜
kt − Ĥt = ̂˜W t − r̂kt
151
15. Real marginal cost
χ̂t = (1− α)̂˜W t + αr̂kt
16. Expected gross return on capital
Et
[
R̂kt+1
]
=
(
rk
)?
(Rk)?
Et
[
r̂kt+1
]− Q̂t + 1− δ
(Rk)?
Et
[
Q̂t+1
]
17. Supply for loans
[
K˜? − N˜?
N˜?
](
R̂kt+1 −Rt
)
+
Rk?
R?
K˜?
N˜?
[Γω (ω¯
ss)− µGω (ω¯ss)] ω¯ssω̂t+1
−R
k?
R?
K˜?
N˜?
µG(ω¯ss)µ̂t+1 = Q̂t +
̂˜
Kt+1 − ̂˜N t+1
18. Net worth
N˜?
γ
̂˜
N t+1 =
(
[1− µ?G(ω¯?)]Rk? −R?) K˜?
Z?
(
Q̂t−1 +
̂˜
Kt − Ẑt
)
+ (1− µ?G(ω¯?))Rk? K˜
?
Z?
R̂kt −
(
N̂? − K̂?
) R?
Z?
R̂t−1
−µ?G(ω¯?)Rk? K˜
?
Z?
µ̂t − µ?Gω(ω¯?)Rk? K˜
?
Z?
ω¯? ̂¯ωt + R?N˜?
Z?
̂˜
N t
19. First-order condition with respect to the debt-to-wealth ratio
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µ?
[
µ?Ψµ(ω¯
?, µ?)G(ω¯?) + Ψ(ω¯?, µ?)G(ω¯?)
1− Γ(ω¯?) + Ψ(ω¯?, µ?) (Γ(ω¯?)− µ?G(ω¯?))
]
Etµt+1
= Et
[
R̂kt+1 −Rt
]
−
[
Rk?
R?
[
R?
Rk?
Ψω(ω¯
?, µ)
Ψ(ω¯?, µ)
− Ψω(ω¯
?, µ)
Ψ(ω¯?, µ)
(Γ(ω¯?)− µ?G(ω¯?))
]]
ω¯?Et ̂¯ωt+1
20. Market clearing conditions
(a) Credit market
D˜?
̂˜
Dt+1 = Q˜
?K˜?
(
Q̂t +
̂˜
Kt+1
)
− N˜? ̂˜N t+1
Debt ̂˜
Bt+1 =
̂˜
Dt+1
(b) Total Resources
̂˜
Y t =
C˜?
Y˜ ?
̂˜
Ct +
I˜?
Y˜ ?
̂˜
I t +
G˜?
Y˜ ?
̂˜
Gt
+
µ?G (ω¯?)Rk?Q?K˜?
Y˜ ?Z?
[
R̂kt + Q̂t−1 +
̂˜
Kt − Ẑt + Gω(ω¯
?)
G(ω¯?)
ω¯?ω̂t
]
+µ?Rk?
G (ω¯?) K˜?
Y˜ ?Z?
µ̂t + r
k? K˜
?
Y˜ ?
ût
21. Some definitions
F (ω¯) =
∫ ω¯
0
1
ωσω
√
2pi
e
− ln(ω)+0.5σ
2
ω
2σ2ω dω
Fω (ω¯) =
1
ωσω
√
2pi
e
− ln(ω)+0.5σ
2
ω
2σ2ω
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Fωω (ω¯) = − 1
ω
Fω (ω¯)
[
1 +
ln(ω) + 0.5σ2ω
σ2ω
]
G (ω¯) =
∫ ω¯
0
ωf(ω)dω = 1− Φ
(
0.5σ2ω − ln (ω¯)
σω
)
Gω (ω¯) = ω¯Fω (ω¯)
Γ (ω¯) =
∫ ω¯
0
ωf(ω)dω + ω¯
∫ ∞
ω¯
f(ω)dω = ω¯ (1− F (ω¯)) +G (ω¯)
Γω (ω¯) = 1− F (ω¯)
Ψ (ω¯, µ) =
Γω (ω¯)
Γω (ω¯)− µGω (ω¯)
Ψµ (ω¯, µ) =
Gω (ω¯) Ψ (ω¯, µ))
Γω (ω¯)− µGω (ω¯)
Ψω (ω¯, µ) =
1
(1− F (ω¯)− µω¯Fω (ω¯))2
− Fω (ω¯) [1− F (ω¯)− µω¯Fω (ω¯)]
− [1− F (ω¯)] [−Fω (ω¯)− µFω (ω¯)− µω¯Fωω (ω¯)]

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Appendix C Chapter 4
Appendix C.1 Tables
Table 34: Variance decomposition at business cycle frequencies
Output
BC Wealth Neutral I-shock Markup Intra Inter MP
Pre-1970 1 2 67 4 6 17 2 0
1970-1984 0 3 56 8 8 21 3 1
Post-1984 0 4 39 6 14 31 5 0
Investment
BC Wealth Neutral I-shock Markup Intra Inter MP
Pre-1970 22 13 7 35 4 2 17 0
1970-1984 7 19 4 45 4 2 18 1
Post-1984 26 16 4 20 6 5 22 0
Consumption
BC Wealth Neutral I-shock Markup Intra Inter MP
Pre-1970 1 6 60 11 1 14 7 0
1970-1984 1 7 47 18 1 15 10 0
Post-1984 1 12 31 15 2 20 19 0
Net Worth
BC Wealth Neutral I-shock Markup Intra Inter MP
Pre-1970 6 92 1 0 0 0 1 0
1970-1984 4 93 1 0 0 0 1 1
Post-1984 1 99 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: It corresponds to periodic components of cycles between 6 and 32 quarters.
BC refers to shocks to the marginal bankruptcy cost and MP to monetary policy
shocks
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Table 35: Variance decomposition at the business cycle frequency
Hours
BC Wealth Neutral I-shock Markup Intra Inter MP
Pre-1970 1 8 1 14 18 52 6 1
1970-1984 1 7 1 19 18 47 6 2
Post-1984 0 7 0 9 23 51 9 1
Labor share
BC Wealth Neutral I-shock Markup Intra Inter MP
Pre-1970 0 0 1 0 95 0 0 4
1970-1984 0 0 2 0 86 1 0 11
Post-1984 0 0 1 0 95 0 0 3
Inflation
BC Wealth Neutral I-shock Markup Intra Inter MP
Pre-1970 0 3 15 8 1 4 11 59
1970-1984 0 2 11 8 1 5 14 58
Post-1984 1 1 10 3 3 8 6 68
Nominal rate
BC Wealth Neutral I-shock Markup Intra Inter MP
Pre-1970 0 15 3 41 0 1 39 1
1970-1984 0 12 1 44 0 0 41 1
Post-1984 6 14 1 48 0 0 29 1
Notes: It corresponds to periodic components of cycles between 6 and 32 quarters.
BC refers to shocks to the marginal bankruptcy cost and MP to monetary policy
shocks
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Table 36: Sign restrictions.
k Consumption Investment Net worth Spread
0 ? + + -
1 ? + + -
Table 37: Percentage of IRFs delivering a negative response upon impact of consump-
tion
Net worth Spread Whole 1954-1969 1970-1983 1984-2006
FOFA corporate 6 35 2 31
FOFA prime 33 18 57 10
Dow Jones corporate 30 45 30 49
Dow Jones prime 55 10 65 22
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Appendix C.2 Figures
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